

NEW TIMES

October 22-28, 1991


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
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
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
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From our mailbag

Editor-in-Chief

Alexander
PUMPYANSKY

Associate editors:

Lev BEZYMENSKY

Alexei BUKALOV

Vitaly GANYUSHKIN

Sergei GOLYAKOV

Vitaly IGNATENKO

Leonid MLECHIN

Marina SHAKINA

Galina SIDOROVA

Lev YELIN

Nikita ZHOLKVER

Designer

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**Editor-in-Chief
of English edition**

Victor KAMOTSKY

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■ I took part in defending the White House. You know what made me write to you? At first occasionally but now rampantly the press has been carrying allegations (made mainly by the KGB special units men) that we owe the victory of democracy to their noninterference. The last straw was an interview granted by the Alfa commander Karpukhin to a correspondent of the *Sovetsky Sport* newspaper. Among other things he said: "Why was I dismissed? Because I did not arrest Yeltsin? Or because I did not seize the Russian Parliament? Though I could have done it." I wonder how was he going to storm the White House alone? The retired general vividly describes the abilities of "his lads," but forgets to mention a little detail – he did give the order to seize the Russian Parliament but it was not carried out by his lads. And they refused to carry it out after careful deliberation, the study of the area and other considerations.

"My boys are practically invulnerable," says Karpukhin. Even if they come under sub-machine-gun fire? And in the White House they would have met with three companies of sub-machine-guns, mostly from OMON. "The invulnerable guys" simply did not want to see how many of

them would survive after they seized (I do not deny such a possibility) the building. I am sure that if they knew that the White House was defended only by unarmed volunteers, no love for democracy would have prevented the attack.

It's about time we put everything in perspective. It's more than enough to know that the party "gave" us *perestroika* and *glasnost* in 1985. All that we need now is that in a couple of months everybody will "realize" that we owe our freedom and democracy to the KGB.

**Gennady Kozhemyakin,
a member of
the first defence line
Moscow, USSR**

■ When the policy of *perestroika* was proclaimed in 1985 I welcomed it as my own, personal holiday. August 19 was another holiday for me. But now all my hopes for a better future have been dashed. We are facing a dictatorship of the lower middle class, who cannot build anything but are great at destroying, robbing, banning, trying, holding meetings and delivering demagogic speeches. We'll be ruled by the mob, which is urging the nation it brought to the very edge of a precipice to move on

ahead. They've found the enemies of the people, the scapegoats who will be blamed for the new rulers' blunders, dilettantism, and ineptitude. All that is left is to remove Gorbachev and unleash open fascist terror against dissidents. Let anti-Communists describe the August developments as "a coup of rascals and scoundrels" and "a military coup staged by a group of traitors," but for me these days will always remain as an attempt of patriotic forces to carry out a socialist revolution. Their defeat is a national tragedy and a state catastrophe.

**A. Gorshkov,
a worker, unaffiliated with
the party, a dissident of
the pre-perestroika era
Kurgan Region, USSR**

■ It has always been my great pleasure to read your magazine *New Times* despite the remoteness of the area in which I live. I hereby congratulate you and the entire team of reporters and encourage you to keep it up so that all of us regular readers of our beloved magazine can get a copy at the appropriate time in any part of this country and the world over.

What interests me most about this magazine that I prefer to

Who is sorry for the Gypsies

■ Why don't we like Gypsies? Only because they are not like everyone else? Your author Leonid Mlechin says (N32/91) that they were among the first to use new trade opportunities. They've always had these opportunities, but may be not on such a scale. They have always engaged in black-marketeering, they live in clover and never stand in lines. Just recently a Gypsy woman from our town told me that she had bought a whole sack of sugar for 350 rubles. And we cannot buy our kilo and a half for the coupons that we have. Then why should you be shocked by the anger of simple working people? We have a joke here, may be you've also heard it, about Gypsies who say that if Gorbachev stays in power another year they will get gold teeth even for their horses.

I am very fond of Gypsy art. But I also like Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian art. Every nation is talented in its own way. But talent is not a mass phenomenon. Gifted people are few in every nation. And Gypsies are no exception here. Each nation has its businessmen.

Unfortunately, there are too many Gypsies who are attracted to black-marketeering.

The author of the article says that Gypsies can hardly rely on government support. I don't know about the present situation and what he means by that, but from my own experience I can tell you that it is not true. I am an invalid and I live far from my place of work. There was a barrack in our town, where a Gypsy woman lived. She earned her living by fortune-telling and used to boast: "There will always be enough Russian fools to help me earn my bread and butter." The barrack was to be torn down and the Gypsy woman was offered an apartment in a new building. I went to the city CPSU committee and asked if they could give the Gypsy woman my apartment so that I could move into hers. After all, she did not work anywhere, what difference did it make to her where she lived? "No," said the committee secretary, "our party pursues a special policy towards Gypsies. We mustn't offend them. They will start complaining, will go to the Supreme Soviet. We'll get

"KGB general was simply scared of us!"

"I prefer to miss my meal rather than to miss any of your weekly editions"

"The organizers of the coup are real patriots"

miss my meal rather than to miss any of your weekly editions is the balance of reporting on world affairs and plain truth on Soviet views this magazine always carries.

Fasure Raheem Adebola
Nigeria

■ President Bush has done everything in his power to bring the Jews and the Arabs to the negotiating table. (Now it seems to have finally taken place.) And what did he achieve? The conference is doomed, since the parties' platforms are incompatible. I believe that both the Jews and the Arabs will achieve much more if they return to the idea they abandoned in 1948. I mean the formation of a single Arab-Jewish (or Jewish-Arab) state with the capital in Jerusalem. This state must be

Jewish for the Jews and Arab for the Arabs. Let the Jews call it "Israel" and the Arabs - "Palestine" and the rest may call it either or both. (One and the same state in Europe is called "Deutschland," "Germany" and "Allemagne.") It can join the EEC, and the League of Arab States. The national languages there must be Hebrew and Arabic, and the parliament must consist of two houses. The main thing is to avoid political domination by either ethnic group. I believe that only in this way will the Arab people quickly and bloodlessly get rid of a "thorn in their side" and the Jews become part and parcel of the surrounding Arab world and be useful to it in the economic and political spheres, thereby guaranteeing their future.

A.Akopyan,
a teacher
Ashkhabad, USSR

■ Just recently I looked through all the issues of your magazine for the last year. I analyzed many articles and got the impression that the *New Times* staff had warned the readers, the public and the country's authorities about the coming coup. Why didn't any one heed the voice of the magazine? And how could you forecast the outcome of the events? Please, explain if you can. One must always look a little bit ahead, let your magazine

teach many of us how to do this.

P.Barabanov,
Chairman of the City
Council of Veterans
Privolzhsk, USSR


■ What interested me was the letter of S.Tokhtabiyev, President of the Fund of the Development of Minor Ethnic Groups.

then don't Gipsies unite to defend their rights? Or perhaps we do have some Gipsy unions and associations? Unfortunately, our press says nothing about it. Nor do I know if the Indian Embassy in Moscow evinces any interest in Gipsies.

The Gipsies roam from place to place in Europe and do not find a safe and decent place for themselves there. And you know what I thought? Perhaps their historical homeland, Northern India, will take them back? You may say: what a strange idea? But this century has seen mass emigrations: of Germans - to Russia, of dukhobors to Canada, and hundreds of thousands of Jews have returned to their historical homeland. Naturally, I do not mean forced emigration. This can be carried out only if the sides reach full agreement. How long can this talented people wander and suffer humiliation and discrimination?

Arnold Anuchkin-Timofeyev,
Cand. of Historical Sciences

Moscow, USSR



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

The fact is that the Slovene ethnic group inhabiting Carinthia - a federal land in Austria - has worked out a plan for setting up a House of Nations in the United Nations. One house will represent all the states, while the other - all the nations and ethnic groups inhabiting the world. Their representatives, despite their place of residence, must have the right to be elected to this House and the right to vote. In order to embrace all the nationalities and ethnic groups but avoid delegating too many representatives to the House, it is necessary to elect representatives according to the percentage of the population. In our plan it looks like this: the nation numbering 71 million would have 8 delegates, and the nations numbering 210 million - 12. Such a representation of ethnic groups in the United Nations would promote the solution of problems which are now facing all Soviet nationalities: they would all be represented in an international body and would have no need to leave the Soviet Union.

Franz Rutar
Austria

Compiled by T.Lekhto

into trouble." He was not afraid to offend me, an invalid who had worked all my life.

Perhaps we could give some areas to the Gipsies and let them live according to their own laws. But not at other people's expense. It looks like Russian people are doomed to shelter everyone who is in trouble. We defend everybody but ourselves. As a result, soon there will be no Russians in Russia. The best people are leaving. And we are not sorry for them. But we are sorry for the Gipsies.

T.Tyrina,
a librarian
Tula Region, USSR

* * *

■ Our press says very little about Gipsies, and naturally I read with great interest the sad "Gipsy ballad." As an Indologist I take a great interest in the fate of this fantastically restless people. I guess the author is right when he says that common people here do not like Gipsies and they cannot rely on the authorities' support. But why

Politics über alles?

Marina Shakina

The economic agreement is criticized from all sides, but everybody can't wait to sign it



Drawing by Victor Bogorad



For the whole last week the leaders of Russia were busy arguing about what should take precedence: politics or economics. Politics prevailed once again, of course, because it was the political motives and interests of republics and individual leaders that dominated their approach to the problem of an economic union. This is right: all the talk that the economic union of former Soviet republics is aimed exclusively at greater economic expediency is intended for simpletons. Such speculations have one principal aim: not to frighten away the republics which wish to be viewed as independent states and to firmly anchor them in the common economic space. After that republics will be faced with the entirely political Union Treaty.

Nothing is new under the sun

Russian lawmakers and advisors absolutely did not share Ivan Silayev's and Grigory Yavlinsky's euphoria over the Alma Ata meeting. The immediate reason for their displeasure was the role assumed by Deputy Premier Yevgeny Saburov, Russia's Minister of the Economy, who represented the Russian Republic at the Alma Ata meeting, having no mandate from either the parliament or the Council of Ministers, and acting exclusively on instructions from Boris Yeltsin, about which the latter never bothered to inform either the government or parliament.

The President of Russia was away on vacation, and it was impossible to sort things out with him. Deputies started discussing whether Russia needed any economic union at all. After some debates they arrived at rather unexpected conclusions which they immediately conveyed to the public. The traditional viewpoint is that no republic can get out of the economic slump alone, but the policy of economic isolation has been visible for the past few years already. Some republics established their own customs services and their parliaments issued decrees banning the export of various products. Facts about customs activities in some republics, which are occasionally leaked to the press, cannot be described otherwise than as plundering pure and simple. One example: Byelorussian police deployed on the border with Russia confiscated a consignment of goods manufactured in Byelorussia on the order from an enterprise working in the Russian Republic. The confiscated consignment was sold, and the money thus raised was divided between the republican treasury, the republican Interior Ministry and the shop which actually sold

the goods. This is how free market relations are understood in some republics...

While President Yeltsin, who dispatched Yevgeny Saburov to Alma Ata with the instructions to get things straight with the economic agreement, was vacationing in the south, the Russian parliament was fuming with indignation reading statistical reports about reexports of natural resources Russia supplied other republics with. If the reports are true, the transaction is nothing new. The Soviet Union's former Comecon partners also engaged in reselling Soviet oil, and their example was readily available for the former Soviet republics. Speaking at the session of the Russian parliament and defending the Alma Ata accords, Grigory Yavlinsky sighed: "The Ukraine is re-exporting oil... So what? Of course, it's cheating, but what else can the Ukraine sell?" For some reason members of parliament were not sympathetic, though. They were increasingly inclined to think that Russia did not really need any economic agreement as far as purely economic matters are concerned and if the republics were going to trade on fair terms.

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine refuted the accusations, but his statement is not likely to produce any serious influence on MPs.

A weak agreement

The draft economic agreement stipulates the republican right to circulate their own currencies and to establish their own customs services. This could not have failed to astonish those whose professional duty is to uphold the interests of Russia. Remarkably, EC experts, who are familiar with the document, were not exactly enthusiastic about the agreement. In their opinion, the term "coordination" is used in the agreement too vaguely and too seldom, and the agreement in general is weak.

Currently there are two alternative viewpoints voiced in the Russian parliament: either to conclude a temporary economic agreement, for instance, for a term of one year, or to work out the basic principles of a political union and to combine the signing of the political agreement with that of the economic one — even if this combination is endorsed by only three to four republics, not by 10 as is the case now. The latter variant was supported by the new strong man of Russia, state secretary Gennady Burbulis.

Yevgeny Saburov, whose explanations were not accepted by the parliament, resigned. But President Yeltsin, who returned from his vacation the day after, refused to let Saburov go, and appeared at the sitting of the Council of the State, declaring that he was determined to sign the agreement. At

the same time, Yeltsin demanded that the 17 additional agreements mentioned in the Big Agreement be worked out within a month. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic approved the economic agreement in general, but set up a commission to develop some of its provisions more thoroughly. Has Yeltsin tamed the parliament? There are reasons to doubt that things will go smoothly. The parliament may yet have some surprises up its sleeve, and there will be no way to avoid the parliament when it finally comes to ratification.

Boris Yeltsin was one of the initiators of the economic agreement, and his personal commitment to an economic union is perfectly understandable. In the long-term prospect, the Yeltsin policy seems very adequate and fits with the historical logic. The opposing view, however, also plays a certain political role in the situation, keeping Russian MPs alerted. The fiery speeches about some forces plundering Russia and turning it into a milker have excited MPs, and this excitement is conveyed to society as well.

The West "surrenders" ... once again

So far Yeltsin has behaved as if he were the only force that will shape the future of the economic agreement. His authority is high, but it is not reasonable to wave off the MPs' sentiments. Yeltsin's opponents have already mastered the art of exploiting his wavers. The President of Russia has earned dislike, to put it mildly, from the Russophone communities in other republics due to his carelessness, not mistakes. ("What Russia do you represent — the historical one or Yeltsin's?" is the first question Russian MPs are asked during their fact-finding tours of other republics.) The faction Soyuz and other such organizations skilfully exploit this. The problem of the Kuril Islands is now being cashed in on. One of the organizers of resistance to "the selling off of the Kurils," leader of the faction Rossiya, Sergey Baburin, has recently toured the islands. If Yeltsin was earlier accused of breaking up the USSR, today he is going to be accused of neglecting the national interests of Russia.

While the Soviet Union is busy debating the economic agreement, the world community is asking the question it has already asked many times: to give or not to give? In the past few years, the world community has been faced with this question every year. Every year, Soviet leaders try to scare

the West with nightmarish visions of a hungry winter in the USSR, but so far these visions have not materialized. The West used to giving assistance and money "for Gorbachev," now it is doing the same "for Gorbachev-Yeltsin." The West is becoming increasingly irritated by the innocence displayed by Soviet leaders when they come to beg their Western counterparts for assistance, specifying only the sum and never offering any documents, reviews or calculations to support it. The patience of Western politicians is remarkable, but some are already wondering when the Soviets are going to do at least something for themselves. Nevertheless, the formerly adamant Japan, the traditionally sympathetic EC and even the United States, which has always demanded that assistance be linked with the beginning of real economic reforms, have surrendered and are going to give us something to live on next year.

A government without a premier

As soon as the popular and charming Ivan Silayev was appointed acting head of the federal government, it turned out that the government of Russia was impotent. Frankly speaking, many members of parliament long ago noticed that the government of Russia was no more competent than the federal government of Valentin Pavlov. It is absolutely evident today that it has not made any progress in any direction in the one year of its performance. The facts recently cited at a sitting of the Soviet of the Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of Russia — examples of deals when precious raw materials were sold abroad at dumping prices — are self-evident. The Supreme Soviet, which seemed extremely pleased with itself, adopted a lot of laws on privatization, and did not care whether they were implemented at all. Vice-President Rutskoy ventured into the government in President Yeltsin's absence, and was shocked by the confusion and chaos he discovered there. The brave general admitted that he would love to personally sort things out in the government or even to become prime minister. However, Rutskoy's vice-presidency makes premiership unattainable for him.

The time of Yeltsin's popularity will soon start running out — if he hesitates with reforms for a while. Nothing has been heard about the formation of a new Council of Ministers, though. There are several candidates for the office of the Russian premier.

Some deputies believe that Yeltsin himself should come to head the government. In fact, this variant is attractive in many ways. Yeltsin is not the leader whom the stubborn local authorities would dare to ignore. There is one serious argument against his becoming the prime minister, though: will he be able to head the economic campaign incorporating extremely unpopular measures which are inevitable in the current situation? To close down or sell non-profit-making enterprises? To trim down state spendings? To reduce the armed forces and arms production? To resolutely carry out tax and price reforms and privatization? Yeltsin's political image will be his main disadvantage. Yeltsin's image is that of a popular hero, not a thrifty and enterprising manager. Yeltsin's business is to win new space for democratic ideas and free market reforms. But the exploration of this space is the task of more competent people. There is no need to put Yeltsin in one more embarrassing situation, making him choose between his own popularity, which has already become part of his ego, and unpopular but unavoidable economic measures.

That is why another viewpoint — that the government of Russia should be headed by a specialist who knows a thing or two about entrepreneurship and does not care much about his or her public image — appears to be more reasonable and promising. Yeltsin must give his premier a *carte blanche* for some time. This would allow the popular hero Yeltsin to distance himself from the unpopular reforms of the government and to preserve his attractive political image.

Two years ago, everybody was very excited about the 500-day programme. It seemed that the very word "programme" was the symbol of success. Today there is no shortage of programmes, but there is a dramatic shortage of action, and there are more and more people, including economists, who say that it is time to do something other than discuss programmes. After the putsch, the green light was given to economic reforms, but politicians are not yet prepared to start them. Politics remains above all other considerations...

Although the economic agreement is heavily criticized from all sides — not only by Russia, but also by Kirghizia and Moldavia, for instance (most criticisms are levelled at its alleged "imperial character" and attempts to restore the centre) — republican leaders are determined to sign it as soon as possible.

No Marshall Plan for USSR

Jean-Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, has officially announced that the USSR's request to join the IMF as an associate member has been granted

The negotiations about the Soviet Union's membership in the world's biggest financial organization have been going on for two years — and they were far from being all easy sailing. The Fund, for example, had to change its own regulations about the admission of new members. To put it mildly, the USSR has too many peculiarities as compared with other IMF members.

In keeping with the signed agreement, the Fund will open its permanent mission in Moscow and periodically carry out an analysis of the country's economic policy and economic indices. It follows the same approach with respect to its full members. But first of all it will invite Soviet bankers to Washington where they will be read a course of lectures at the IMF Institute. The themes of the lectures: regulation of the money mass and operations with foreign currency.

The status of an associated member does not give one the right to vote or help one get credits. Nonetheless, there are some benefits. Now the USSR has access to IMF seminars, programmes of technical assistance and international expertise.

The USSR's full membership in the IMF, however, is undesirable for the West. For the rapidly disintegrating country can hardly meet the Fund's main goal — cooperation in the field of international politics with a view of ensuring the continuous growth of the world economy. Besides, the question about full membership is linked to the need to provide significant aid. And it could be provided only if the USSR implements radical economic reforms, the signs of which have yet to be seen.

IMF membership is a prerequisite for participation in the World Bank. This is another conundrum because the Bank's leaders do not know how many partners from the former USSR they will have to deal with. According to the Bank's officials, Moscow can easily find for itself the financial resources it is requesting by lowering the ceiling of military allocations to five percent of the GNP. This measure will generate 80-90 billion dollars. According to the Bank's calculations, the USSR can also solve the problem of the budget deficit by stepping up the production of oil and gas and increasing export by 40 percent over a 3-year period.

Following the USSR's admission to the IMF, the strategy of the Fund's economic aid to the Soviet Union will change with the domination of a multilateral trend, that is the rendering of assistance by many developed countries, not just by the United States, Germany and Japan. The Senior Vice President of the World Bank, Mogen Qureshi, has spoken in favour of giving the USSR financial aid so that it could "pay in hard currency for a part of its purchases from the countries of Eastern Europe." It is assumed that the World Bank and the IMF will allocate 4 billion dollars annually with the remaining part of the funds — approximately 3 billion dollars — coming via the channels of other financial institutions. But the USSR's main task, stressed M. Qureshi, is to create conditions for domestic and foreign investments.


It is specified in the agreement that the IMF is also to provide technical assistance to the republics. But first the central government and the republics should make things clear in their political and economic relations. Only after that will the IMF decide what aid should be given to Moscow and the republics.

According to David Mulford, US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, the special status will make it possible for the USSR to work out and implement a more sensible programme of reforms than the plans proposed by different academic groups. He believes that if the USSR provides the required economic information, including that on the state of its gold reserves and comparative data of the state budget with the military items, the IMF will continue the analysis of the Soviet economy.

Even though the status of an associated member does not call for a transitional period at the end of which Moscow would automatically become a full member, the IMF will soon be able to play the role of a potent catalyst for selective Western investment provided for the reasonable programmes of transition to the market system. Yet one should not expect the aid to be too generous.

"I do not propose repeating the model of the Marshall Plan," emphasized Jean-Michel Camdessus at the signing ceremony, "because this country has its own peculiarities." Any form of international support is always contingent upon the efforts of the country itself. And the greater the efforts of the given country to transform itself and create the conditions for its own prosperity, the stronger will be the support of the rest of the world.

Artyom Ustinov



Drawing by Sergei Khasabov

The court and the procurator: no common aims

The investigation of the coup attempt has lasted less than two months. Nevertheless, a lot of rumours have already spread and scandals have erupted. *New Times* reporter **Oleg Vishnyakov** talks with Prof. **Valery SAVITSKY**, D.Sc. (Law), head of the sector of problems of justice at the Institute of the State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences

New Times. The lawyer of the defendant Grushko has lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, asking it to check whether or not his client was arrested lawfully. The Supreme Court accepted the complaint for consideration. However, V. Stepankov, Procurator-General of the Russian Federation, did not appear in court. The procurator's office and the court, he said, should tackle these ticklish points "by means of negotiation, consultations with scholars and legislators." What do you think?

Valery Savitsky. The right of an arrested man to ask the court to verify whether he was arrested lawfully is envisaged in the legislation of most countries of the world. In Britain, for instance, it was introduced by the parliament back in the 17th century. The checking of the complaint by the court is an additional guarantee of the lawful arrest or detention of a person. In a number of cases other measures can be taken, such as the signed promise not to leave the place of residence or the guarantee given by another person. So why arrest?

The existing code of criminal procedure of the Russian Federation does not contain a provision for appealing against the arrest in court. That is why until recently a person arrested by the procurator at the preliminary investigation could complain only to a superior procurator, and it was a futile business. On September 5, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR adopted a Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms. It says that the arrested person has the right to appeal to the court against what he believes to be an unlawful act, and the court must examine that complaint. The declaration has a direct action, that is, it must be applied by all bodies of authority, including the procurator's office and the court, without any references to the absence of a law on the procedure of verifying the complaint, without additional explanations. Incidentally, the deputies did not invent anything new in this case. The provision about judicial control over arrests is formulated in Article 9 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights ratified by the USSR back in

1973. It appears therefore that, having fulfilled our commitment 18 years later by passing an appropriate law, we refuse to apply it.

I think that the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which accepted the complaint for consideration, acted correctly, lawfully. Instead of following the law and fulfilling the court's decision, the Procurator-General of the Russian Federation talks about the need for negotiation and consultations. This fact once again shows what an insignificant role the court plays in our country. In another country, for example in the United States, an attorney would not dare behave in such a way with regard to the court.

N.T. Perhaps Stepankov was right in saying that negotiations with the court are necessary for the sake of the "common cause," as he put it.

V.S. There can be no common cause here! It is high time to get rid of the ideological stereotype that the court and the procurator have common aims and tasks. If that is so, why should the taxpayers keep both bodies?

Let's open the code of criminal procedure. We shall see in it many articles which begin roughly like this: "The court, the judge, the procurator, the investigator and the person who holds an inquest must..." All of them are in the same harness, so that no one would "lean out." This explains why, together with procurators, the Interior Ministry, and the KGB, judges were included in the provisional


anti-crime committees which disappeared ingloriously. I am sure that as long as the court is equated with the procurator, as long as they are linked by the "common cause," as long as the court is regarded as merely one of the anti-crime bodies, there can be no talk of real justice. As for substitutes, we have more than enough of them.

N.T. The lawyers of defendants complain that they have limited access to the documents of the investigation. They refer to the Russian legislation which says in black and white that the lawyer who is allowed to conduct the case has the right to read all the relevant materials. The Union law does not contain such a provision, and this circumstance was used by the Procurator's Office of the Russian Federation. So what law should be applied here?

V.S. The obvious conflict between the laws reflects the legal muddle in which we now live. The Russian Federation's code of criminal procedure has been elaborated in greater detail. The legal status and concrete actions of the counsel for the defence are defined more thoroughly in it. It is strange, however, that, denying the lawyer's right to read the materials of the case, the Procurator-General of the Russian Federation refers to the obsolete Union legislation, which he finds more suitable for him in the given case. Following the declaration of state sovereignty of Russia, he should have preferred the law of the Russian Federation. The Union legislation proceeds from the unscrupulous attitude of the lawyer who, knowing all the materials of the case, will begin to confuse the investigation, and so on. I think, however, that we should effect democratic changes at some point.

N.T. Newspapers carried articles describing the conditions in which the putschists are held, for instance, the list of products they receive in parcels. Isn't it a violation of the rights of persons under investigation?

V.S. Reports on conditions in which the putschists are held in the isolation wards are quite lawful, in my opinion. The information revealing that they are kept not in solitary cells but jointly with persons arrested on other charges, and about the food ration determined for such persons does not violate their rights in any way. In fact, it is the explanation of standards common for everyone. It is a different matter when the contents of food parcels are revealed. What is the purpose of reporting that Starodubtsev, one of the putschists, received a piece of smoked beef in a



Vladimir Kryuchkov's testimony appeared in *Der Spiegel*. The KGB also sold documents to the West

parcel, another putschist, Generalov, a roasted chicken, and Shenin, also a putschists, honey and tomatoes? Why discuss publicly the tastes of the arrested? I regard information of this kind as impermissible interference in private life and a humiliation of human dignity. Articles of this kind are more proof of the extremely low legal standards in this country.

N.T. One of the lawyers said that Gorbachev should be questioned not as a witness but as a victim.

V.S. I think it is a far-fetched statement. All of us can claim that we are victims and should be recognized as such. The lawyer apparently wanted to prove that since Gorbachev is a victim, the investigation and the court should not believe his testimony, because he is an interested person. It is naive to believe that. Whatever the procedural status of Gorbachev — as a witness or a victim — no one will take on faith and without comparison the evidence of the man whom the putschists tried to remove from power...


N.T. Is it justified that high officials of the Russian Procurator's Office demand fees for interviews, obviously preferring Western newspapers and magazines, which are prepared to pay foreign currency for sensational information about "the life of the putschists?"

V.S. It is more a moral than a legal question. The media should not publish what must not be made public. This is the main concern. Generally speaking, newspapers and magazines pay for the interviews given to them.

N.T. What can you say about the publication of evidence given by the putschists in *Der Spiegel*?

V.S. Well, it is quite a different matter. The witnesses, experts, lawyers had been strictly warned about their responsibility for divulging the materials of the investigation. Even People's Deputies of the USSR, members of the parliamentary commission of inquiry into the reasons and circumstances of the coup, had given written pledges not to make public the records of evidence. Nevertheless, the records and video cassettes went abroad. Someone evidently received a pretty sum for them. I can only say: shame!

Someone alleged in a TV broadcast that the main consequence of the unlawful spreading of documents is violation of the presumption of innocence of the defendants. In fact, there is no connection with the presumption of innocence here.



It is an attempt to divert public attention from negligence in the keeping of documents of the investigation.

N.T. Will the putschists be tried under Article 64 (Treason to the Motherland) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation? The lawyers insist that this article cannot be applied to the actions of their clients.

V.S. A group of research associates of the Institute of the State and Law published a statement in *Moscow News* on August 21. In their opinion, the putschists must be held responsible under Article 64 of the Criminal Code. We saw the drawbacks of this article even then. The very name of this article is not appropriate for the given case. However, it has exact wording: "Conspiracy with the aim of seizing power." Proceeding from this formula, the actions of the putschists can and should be qualified under Article 64.

N.T. How great, in your opinion, is the danger of the mass campaign for the search of persons involved in the coup?

V.S. This danger seems quite serious to me. The main thing is not to "go deep," looking for culprits in regions and even districts. The information received by the provinces during the three days of the coup was so scant and unclear that it could confuse even the most loyal democratic leaders. At the same time, persons from the higher echelons of power in the Union and republics, the Supreme Soviet, the Presidential Office, the Central Committee of the Party, the Defence and Interior Ministries and the KGB, all those involved in the coup must be punished.

N.T. The media reports more and more frequently that the trial of the putschists will be held in camera. Is it so, and what is your attitude to the possibility of holding an open trial?

V.S. The presumption based on the Constitution of the USSR says that proceedings in all courts shall be open to the public. The court can divert from this general principle. However, I completely rule out the possibility of a secret trial. The times have changed. Since the court will hear the case of a coup d'état, information containing state secrets will surely come up at the sessions. The court may hold **some sessions** in camera in order to keep the secrets. It is allowed to do that by law.

N.T. You have already talked about a lack of respect for judicial power. What must be done to maintain judicial power at a proper level?

V.S. First of all, the judges must be independent. They must acquire their powers from higher authorities for life or until a certain age. As a result, when making one or another decision, a judge will not fear that some people will not like it and he will be removed from his post. Independent judicial power must examine not only concrete civil and criminal cases, but also control executive and legislative power. If some progress has been made in judicial control over executive power (a person can appeal against the unlawful actions of officials and government bodies infringing on his rights, the court can settle conflicts connected with strikes, the activity of mass media, the founding of public associations), a complete vacuum remains in the sphere of judicial control over law making. Our parliamentarians do not think about how the laws adopted by them will be taken by the court, because the latter are unable to influence the law-making process.

It is now difficult to settle the question of founding the Constitutional Court of the USSR. It is not clear whether or not the Supreme Court of the country will remain, and what functions it will fulfill. One thing is certain, however: regardless of the future state system on the territory of the former USSR, independent and authoritative judicial power must be built. It should have the legal and practical possibility of actively influencing the decisions and actions of legislative and executive power.

The Dance of Little Swans



Tatiana
Ivanova

The state can neither feed nor clothe its citizens — it cannot even provide enough light bulbs to go around. Can it protect us against public insults at least?

Now it is clear to everyone that the nation cannot feed all its citizens. The collective-farm system is feeding itself, but just barely, and gives family farmers no land. Nor is the country able to clothe its citizens: all the textile industry equipment is out of order, the raw materials suppliers have found other clients, privatization is impossible because honest people have no money, and it is bad taste to deal with dishonest ones.

Now it is clear that we cannot illuminate the streets in the country's cities and settlements: bulbs are in short supply because glass and tungsten are. Nor can the nation protect people from bandits and robbers, because the bandits are well armed, cunning, agile, and fearless. Our law enforcement agencies are equipped with cars without spares and petrol, their staff are awkward and cowardly, because who's going to risk his life for such meagre pay? The pay cannot be raised for the reason that the printing press, working round the clock without days off, does not produce enough money for the militia, its turnout is just enough to maintain up the army which is short of housing for its officers and men and numerically out of proportion to its mission, but which, nevertheless, is to be reinforced with new conscripts this fall...

Now it is clear that if anything hurts, or if you feel poorly, it's no use going to the pharmacy. The government is in no position to keep the nation supplied with medicine. There are not enough vials for liquid remedies, and not enough boxes for pills. And there are no raw materials to process them from, in the first place, because pharmaceutical factories have been closed as harmful to the environment, and they will be reopened only after being made ecologically sound which, at the most conservative estimate, will take about three decades and

three years. Hopefully, the next generation of Russians will use Soviet-made purgatives. There is always hope because the worst thing that can happen to man is the loss of all hope, although it's hard to conceive of anything worse than what has happened to us... Some optimists say the worst is yet to come...

So much for that aspect of our life. And now let me ask you this question: can our state protect its citizens from insults and offences? This takes neither raw materials, vertical economic links, bottles, boxes — nor even stoppers, for the want of which, as far as I can gather, we are not offered what can be poured into bottles. Can insults, public ones, at least, be cut short?

If the KGB archives are off limits to the unauthorized, can I at least take a peep? Can I find out, for instance, who carried the placard showing Alexander Yakovlev as a shooting target and the legend: "We shall not miss next time." Can we find out who has written the legend and who has been behind it all? And who can make these names public?

Let's unwind the "140 billion" case. To ask my colleagues at the newspapers *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and *Pravda* — the authors of the most interesting articles on Genady Filshin's crimes — to shed new light on the most grievous crimes committed by other members of the Russian government and Boris Yeltsin himself — to ask journalists to share with the public the secrets of their profession, to explain where they got the overwhelming facts from, how they came into possession, who and in what words inspired them to creative achievements.

The nation would not have sustained any material damage from such information (obviously there is no more damaging it). Anyway, it would be easier to breathe — just to breathe in it.

The papers, magazines, the radio and television are airing

Zhirinovsky's revelations. He promises, for instance, that when he becomes president, the Baltic countries will become dumps of radioactive waste, and that on the borders with them he'd put up fans to blow the contaminated air to them. He says that in the Ukraine, there live peasants who love bacon, well, let them gorge themselves with it and not stick their necks out. He says he will teach all the others to pronounce the phrase "the State Emergency Committee" — and there are to be no republics either in the Caucasus or in Central Asia, those are just the outlying regions of Russia, and when he sorts them all out, he will expand to Europe and restore order there — all those Hungarians, Czechs, Poles and other aliens have been given too much freedom.

The journalists giggle, smiling sarcastically with their tongues in their cheeks — Zhirinovsky's monologues are no worse than those by the satirist Zhvanetsky, and in some ways even better. But a sense of humour is an exquisite substance, it is not at all to be possessed by all the representatives of all the nations and ethnic groups inhabiting one sixth of the globe. What's more, the country is obliged to protect from insults even those of its citizens who have no sense of humour at all. The right to protection from insults takes neither a college diploma nor a certificate from the house management office on being well read and refined. Why should a Georgian, who barely speaks Russian, hear from Zhirinovsky that he is a "shish-kebab maker," and why should an Ukrainian peasant woman hear that she is just a villager and ought to eat her bacon in silence? Are you saying that Zhirinovsky is mentally deranged? Well, let us get his head examined and ascertain the diagnosis for all the nation to hear. Is he a hooligan? All right, sue him, put him on trial, give him 15 days


in jail and fine him 5,000 rubles! Or... I don't know how much in damages he is supposed to pay. Anyway, an insult to national dignity is punishable by law, and there can be no disagreement about that.

What does the country lack to guard its citizens against insults? Court premises? Judges? Chairs for the judges to sit on? Pens to write the court hearings minutes with? All right, come over to my place, I'll give you a pencil.

In Moscow's busiest street I buy the paper, called *Puls Tushina*. Its editorial, by V. Fomichev, its editor-in-chief, is called "A Pack of Beasts." It was about those guilty of "super-crimes" in the USSR — freemasons, Zionists and Judaists. Freemasonry and Judaism are phenomena which are hard to define, all right. But Judaism is a religion, after all. It is professed by millions. Why should they be insulted in public?

Is an insult to religion punishable by law? Just read the article which is to the right of the editorial. It says that Academician Arbatov campaigns for "a unilateral disarmament of our country." It says that Filshin is "auctioning our country off." It says that the composition of all the administrative bodies ought to be sorted out from the viewpoint of its members' nationalities and that the results of this analysis should be made public and "the so-called democrats" be analysed accordingly. In the article, called "The Putsch," the selfsame editor-in-chief asks himself the question: "Why call criminals those who have arrested the man chiefly to blame for our predicaments?" The article, called "Whose Echo Is It?" dwells on a special ethnic composition of the staff of the radio station, and the station itself is described as "frankly Nazi." "In a continued genocide of Russians, unprecedented in history, the radio station 'The Echo of Moscow' plays the role of a coordinating Zionist centre."

The sense of humour of *Puls Tushina*'s editors can be judged by the following quotations: "Lest anyone should guess that he could barely read and write, Boris Leonidovich Pasternak



Drawing by Yuri Prokopchuk

kept in his Peredelkino country house a large library..." "Korotich received the following note from Grisha Baklanov: 'Vitaly, I'm sending you some souvenirs from Tel Aviv.'" Batkin was robbed: "The jaw of Joshua son of Nun's donkey, a bottle of champagne drunk by Beilis and the nail on which Marina Tsvetayeva hanged herself have been stolen..." Gavril Popov, Moscow's mayor, is described by *Puls Tushina* in no uncertain terms as a "Mafiosi go-getter."

Does the Law on the Press allow such a paper to be published?

Are you, Fomichev, free to insult people to your heart's content?

And here is another paper, called *Den* (Day). With the sense of his moral righteousness, and of that of being baited for dissidence, he unashamedly published profiles of his own. Look: this is me, Prokhanov, talking with Oleg Baklanov, a member of the State Emergency Committee now

under investigation. I have nothing to be embarrassed about, I am proud of being in his company! And here is a note by O. Shenin, "written an hour before arrest and handed over to *Den* editors at the author's request. Yes, Shenin phoned me on August 22. We talked with him. He had written his note in a hurry, "on some loose sheets." And there is nothing you can do to me!

What are they "word-painting in colour" after the failure of the coup? They are just preparing the next one! "We have received the idea of 'communism' from Trotsky in 1917, and we should not like to get 'democracy' from Rutsenko..." "All the present rulers have received handouts in dollars..." "Thousands of lives lost with the connivance of Gorbachev..." Yakovlev and Shevardnadze are "informers"... The putschists sent armoured troops to Moscow in order to protect themselves from "Khasbulatov's gunmen."

The democrats are reaching for "nuclear arsenals" so as to put them under the control of "Bush and Shamir"... Silayev "curried favour with" Solzhenitsyn, but "can any writer worth his salt be a guest of such a government?" "The current governments are creating a criminal situation."

In the "Word to the Nation," we were all denigrated wholesale. Then we were told that there were "statesmen" capable of putting Russia on the right track.

We saw a lot of those "statesmen" on August 19-21, and enjoyed their company all right. Whom do you have to offer us now instead of the "so-called" Yeltsin and Gorbachev, Khasbulatov and Popov, Rutsenko, Yavlinsky and Silayev? Having informed us that criminal situation is created by none other than the government, *Den* (just like the Health Ministry which warns smokers about the hazards of their addiction) also keeps warning us to the effect that "no matter how the Democrats should dodge, no matter what awesome processions they should stage, and no matter how hard they should try to impose the blessings of the free market on us, remember: the Russian people will not forgive anyone a new campaign of terror against patriots."

I have a feeling that the newspaper *Den* does not believe in what it says. Because what it is doing amounts to precisely a campaign of terror against patriots. (If by patriot we mean not a jingoist, but someone working for the good of his country). The paper is being tolerated, after all. The patriots and the Russian people put up with it... Is this moral terror? But when Comrade Prokhanov and company changed over to physical terror, the Russian people did not take it any longer.

I am convinced that it is about time we stopped putting up with moral terror, too. We've had enough. We know from our bitter experience that the changeover from moral to physical terror can be abrupt. You turn on your TV set — and see the Dance of Little Swans from Tchaikovsky's *Swan Lake* by way of entertainment...

The discreet charm of Russian democracy

Poel Karp

Triumphal repercussions of the victory over the putschists are still resounding in our memory, but the reforms opposed by the putsch's leaders haven't even started yet. Hopes fade away, but this has practically escaped being realized. We don't hear about democratic protests voiced as late as last September, when the President gathered his reactionary crew which ousted him from power this August.

Liberals who have defended law and order and occupied seemingly important positions are again reproved by adherents of authoritarianism. And, as always in our country, opposition to liberalism is allowed only to the reaction, only to conserva-

tives, only from the right. This time Nevzorov has spoken the truth — his really is the only systematically oppositional programme on TV. An equally open opposition to the authorities from the other, democratic, side is allowed only as an exception. Even Tatiana Mitkova and Dmitry Kiselev haven't yet returned to TV, not to mention futile expectations to see Leonid Batkin or Sergei Kovalev regularly appearing for at least half an hour a week. Democratic criticisms gain somewhat easier access to newspapers and magazines, but even there voices from the Nevzorov side, representing "millions of ours, for whom the first appeal of the vaudeville committee was nevertheless a word of hope," prevail. Even the liberal *Izvestia* publishes one after another articles by Alexei Kiva, Alexander Tsipko and Gavriil Popov, ridiculously returning society to Pavlov's, Lukyanov's and Kryuchkov's ideas. Those who will survive the next coup will be able to appreciate these articles as we have appreciated the "Letter of 53" or the "Word to the people."

It's noteworthy that the Emergency Committee did not at all proclaim Marxism-Leninism or the socialist option. The plotters did realize that it was already necessary to behave differently. Nowadays the defenders of an authoritarian order themselves often explain that Socialist ideas have proven economically inconsistent in our country. This is true, of course. But it is not only the so-called Marxism-Leninism that has collapsed, the same is true of the idea of social engineering, which as such is wider than the first.

Political scientists and economists discuss dozens of social models and argue which is the best and which is to be imposed, being absolutely unwilling to take into account the economic or social reality. Whatever their efforts to condemn Marx and Lenin, or to extoll the Lord and the Emperor, they remain Bolsheviks. Because Bolshevism is specific not for its ideals — at times banal and at times impossible to implement — but for its uncrushable faith in the possibility of altering society's life arbitrarily, in conformity with a scheme, disregarding the forces and tendencies existing in it. Any society is mobile, and no political force beholds the events indifferently, but, having attained power, somehow introduces corrections into the order that comes into being. However, in the 20th century there ap-

peared forces eager not to **correct**, but to **decree** a social order, and Bolshevism is the most powerful and the most obstinate of them. It changes attire, but it does not want to admit its obvious defeat.

It's absurd to argue about "models" abstractly considering, for instance, the "advantages of the kolkhoz (collective farm) system." Our state's love of enormous estates obviously contradicts the tendency of development of the

Russian village, which has since days of old longed for land and freedom. Those who refer to the fact that in Israel a still more complete form of socialization has been established — that of the kibbutz, or commune —

don't want to see that it was established there by people who fled from persecutions, and the collectivization as such was persecution. This is why the idealistic commune survived, while the kolkhoz, which granted a personal plot to a collective farmer by way of compromise, proved ineffective. An artificial scheme was crushed by the reality.

Now social engineers suggest abolishing the national territorial division in both the USSR and the Russian Federation, referring to the polyethnicity of the USA, "where all ethnic groups can develop anywhere in the country and where there are no administrative national formations." And it is again forgotten that the United States is a country of immigrants who have together ousted and conquered the indigenous population, which for that very reason is the only one to possess a definite territory, the reservations, since at one time they possessed the whole country. But Blacks, whose life was no better than the Indians, have not separated territorially because, although as slaves, they subdued and populated the country together with the British, French, Germans, Poles, Jews, Italians and others. On the contrary, the Russian Empire has been formed primarily by conquering other states and peoples in the name of the Moscow State. All these peoples continue on the whole to live where they used to, and are united not only by common languages and religion, but also by the structure of economic life.

The destiny of Northern peoples, who were denied neither the right to vote unanimously nor to receive higher education (at the entrance exams often they were not required to demonstrate the same level of knowledge expected of the others), was determined by neglect of their specific world view and economic life. They were even patronized, but deprived of the right to independence and self-protection, and thus they were bought. Today Zhirinovskiy suggests that that which caused irreparable damage to the northern peoples be applied to all peoples of the Union, while Gavriil Popov demands the same for all peoples of Russia. Thus the mine of national protest is laid, which, together with the national mine, in 1917 rent asunder the country which nobody had wanted to reform. But the people who came to power after the explosion did not want to reckon with the reality either, so they began building socialism. Nor did our putschists want to reckon with the blatant bankruptcy

The reforms opposed by the putsch's leaders haven't yet begun

of this attempt. The same, evidently, holds true with some of their opponents now in power. This is why Alexei Kiva assures us that "either the power is strong, or it collapses." But what makes the power strong? Pushkin said long ago, "No, not the army or foreigners' assistance, but only the support of peoples!" The power is made strong by wise legislation meeting the requirements of economics and the notions of law and morality. Yet we understand the strength of power as glorification of executive power, as a cult of authority on any level and the conviction that its good intentions are not to be limited by law. As a result, a city's mayor sells its buildings to meet the city budget in spite of the latter being approved by the city council. Gavriil Popov has thus commented on law: "Since this power is firmly supported only by an association of progressive citizens, the leading role in the system of this power must belong not to the corps of deputies, but to the leaders of the executive power."

And if it so happens that the deputies dare express a vote of censure of the executive power, albeit by two thirds, Popov demands re-election not only for the boss under censure, but for the deputies themselves as well, to prevent them from trying again. The Communist Party, too, called itself an association of progressive citizens, and the fact that persons who have resigned from it style themselves that way doesn't change anything. Citizens, whether communists, ex-communists, or anti-communists, who deem themselves progressive have no right to give orders to the rest. Claims to this right constitute the very essence of social engineering.

Yeltsin's success in the presidential elections was the answer to his steps to address the reality. He was the first among the highest echelon of power to recognize, though not always consistently, that the prosperity of the Russian peoples, who have everything they need to live as well as other Europeans do, is

impossible without first being freed from the imperial burden.

His election to Russia's presidency urged those who were not ready even for meagre concessions to Russia's independence, agreed upon in Novo-Ogaryovo, to hurry ahead with the coup. Its failure again confirmed Russian democracy's charm. But said Alexander Tsipko: "Yeltsin and Russia's government will have to assume full responsibility for Russia's ruined economy." "Full responsibility," no more no less! Nothing is left not only to Stalin and Brezhnev, but even to Ryzhkov and Pavlov, who consciously ruined the financial system and undermined the ruble in order to prevent the advent of a market economy. All fault lies with Yeltsin, who has spent slightly over a hundred days in the presidential office. But it gets worse: "...Neither Yeltsin nor Russia's deputies have the mandate to dissolve the old Big Russia" (i.e., the USSR. — P.K.). And Tsipko demands a referendum in the Russian

Privatization has turned into pillaging again. Even the most progressive citizens have no right to appropriate what belongs, albeit nominally, to the people as a whole

Federation in order to learn from the peoples who inhabit it if they agree to other republics' secession. Ergo, the Ukraine's, Estonia's or Tajikistan's destiny is not to be decided upon by their respective peoples. In fact, Tsipko demands that Yeltsin should enter upon the Yugoslav path, i.e., renounce his political


reputation. The key to all this lies in whether people can make decisions for themselves or whether the right to decide on their behalf belongs to the "progressive citizens" inspired with lofty ideals of socialism, autocracy, or racial superiority.

National problems are so sharp in our country only because the claim to the right to decide on others' behalf reveals itself in them with startling clarity. Indeed, nobody is going to erect the Great Chinese Wall near Mikhailovsky village on the border between Russia and the Ukraine. Nor does Estonia take any unilateral steps in Pechory, but only recalls that this territory was alienated from it in 1940, and thus protects itself from the recent claims to the Estonian Narva. Under a democratic regime ethnic problems would soon be reduced to their proper, far from prominent place, especially since all of us need each other in some way or other, be it in Russia or in the USSR. This is practically indisputable now. Human multitudes are involved in disputes only when they want to decide whether our ties should be voluntary or compulsory, and there is no free will without independence.

Only freedom and guarantees of personal well-being encourage labour in transition to a democratic economic system. The results of this transition depend on which way the suffocating economic monster will choose to break down into effectively competing entities. Generally speaking, the most important thing to be derived from our history is the understanding that the ends do not justify the means, but the means determine the result of progress towards the end declared. Truly, the end cannot be just which requires unjust means.

Unjust means lead to the transformation of ends in 1917, which continues in the same vein to this day, when seemingly noble tasks are carried out without considering the existent social relations. We have turned privatization into pillage and marauding because the reactionaries and even the liberals do not want to hear, and the Democrats have no opportunity to say openly that even the most progressive citizens have no right to appropriate what is, albeit nominally, the national wealth.

The national wealth can be neither sold nor arbitrarily distributed among the chosen ones. It must returned, naturally, for the right of prescription, not to its original owners, but — in all justice — to all citizens. Only once to each has been returned his share of the national wealth, which he is free to use as he chooses, will it be possible to expect that people will not consider privatization one more confiscation and that social relations will change, and not merely forms of compulsion.



Drawing by Vladimir Mokievsky

ST. PETERSBURG

Tbilisi. The history of a conflict

Alexander Sokolov,

Board Member, Human Rights
Centre under the Memorial Society

*Beautiful and proud land!
You answer with a joke to malice,
But there is always a sweet taste of blood
In each drop of your sour wine.*

*Alexander Galich,
"The Song of Tbilisi"*

The phone is silent all night long. No calls from Tbilisi. What's happening there? Has Gamsakhurdia cut inter-city phone lines? Has anything happened?

The phone rings at last. This is Georgy Zumbadze, the representative of the National Democratic Party of Georgia in Moscow, "the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador" of another Georgy — Georgy Chanturia who is now kept in Ward One of the Tbilisi preliminary detention prison. The details of Chanturia's arrest are widely known: the plane on which he was flying to Moscow was returned to Tbilisi. The Tbilisi airport officials were in such a hurry to carry out the order that they did not even allow the plane to burn out fuel before landing.

Georgy Khaindrava, a cameraman whose film about the April 9, 1989, crackdown on a peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi is known throughout the world, is being kept at the same prison with Chanturia. The man enjoys such a great amount of popular trust, that although not a member of any party, he was elected to the collective leadership of the opposition, the National Congress of Georgia. Khaindrava did everything possible to inform the country and the world about the September 2 crackdown on a demonstration in Tbilisi and the resulting confrontation. This did not correspond to what the President of Georgia wanted and on the night of September 18 the cameraman was arrested in his home.

**Georgia's most well-known
prisoner of conscience**

The complex of grey buildings separated from the House of the Government by Lesya Ukrainka Street, the name of which



Every other man is an officer in Georgia's National Guard

means as much to a resident of Tbilisi as the name Lubyanka does to a Muscovite. The grey buildings incorporate the preliminary detention prison of the Georgian KGB. Dzhaba Ioseliani, the leader of the paramilitary organization Mkhedrioni, is being kept there. Ioseliani is hated and feared by the President of Georgia. One story explains why. Once a young man came to Ioseliani and asked: "Why do we calmly watch how Zviad pits people against each other and foments hatred? Why don't we uproot this weed?" Professor Ioseliani, 65, replied: "If this traitor goes down in history as a martyr who died for the liberation of Georgia, it would be a historical injustice. People must see his real face."

The life of Dzhaba Ioseliani is not what one expects a politician's life to be. He was convicted three times for criminal offenses and at the age of 25 (1951) he got a 25-year sentence. He was pardoned at the age of 36. After the release he did an extramural course at a secondary school and entered the Theatrical Institute. 20 years later Professor Ioseliani was already delivering lectures to students at his alma mater and Tbilisi University. The former prisoner is the author of many plays, novels, short stories, articles and essays, but he is too active to confine himself to literature alone. In 1989 Ioseliani founded a paramilitary organization which he called the Mkhedrioni — The Cavaliers. Ioseliani intended this organization to be the core of the armed forces of Georgia after the republic gained full independence.

Ethnic conflicts started flaring up in Georgia, unrest swept Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. Dzhaba Ioseliani issued calls for peaceful settlement. He said the ethnic conflicts had been incited by the Kremlin via the Kremlin's right hand agent provocateur in Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his Helsinki Union. Ioseliani also said Zviad Gamsakhurdia "succumbed to his ambitions in order to gain cheap popularity, he insulted and humiliated



Taking a nap between meetings...

other nations. Anyway the unwillingness to seek a common language with the Ossets, Lezgins and Abkhazians will cost us dearly. God knows the relations with which nations Zviad is going to upset and when he is going to do it."

The Ossets still remember the Mkhedrioni with a feeling of respect. The units under Dzhaba Ioseliani's command became the buffer force that put down the first conflicts in Southern Ossetia. However, Ioseliani could no longer preserve peace and calm in the region after the Gamsakhurdia puppets in the Supreme Soviet of Georgia abolished the Autonomous Region of Southern Ossetia and imposed a curfew there. It might have been possible for the Mkhedrioni to settle the conflict without fighting and bloodshed in December 1990, using its popularity in Southern Ossetia, but Ioseliani's demand that the Georgian police be withdrawn and the curfew lifted as the basic condition for negotiations was rejected by Tbilisi as unacceptable. On February 18 Soviet army units attacked the Mkhedrioni base at Shav nabada, and the next day Gamsakhurdia's most prominent op-

ponent was arrested. His lawyer was isolated from the investigation following a series of threats against him and Ioseliani, who had gone on a hunger strike, was kept incommunicado for a long time. Even representatives of the International Helsinki Federation were not allowed to see him.

What are the ancestors of the Ossets guilty of?

During the first demonstrations in Tbilisi's Rustaveli Prospekt this September crowds assembled around the KGB prison chanting the name of Dzhaba Ioseliani. People thought that Ioseliani could hear them, but he could not: the windows of the KGB prison open into an inner yard and no sound from the outside comes through. Amnesty International has registered Dzhaba Ioseliani as a political prisoner. Chanturia and Khaindrava whose cases are currently examined by Amnesty International are likely to get the status of prisoner of conscience.

Amnesty International is also very concerned about the fate of Torez Kulumbegov, the Chairman of the

Supreme Soviet of Southern Ossetia who was kidnapped from the negotiations. The Kulumbegov trial has recently started in Tbilisi, but it will hardly be just: suffice it to mention that the indictment (circulated in Moscow by the Human Rights Committee of the Georgian Parliament) begins with the words: "The preliminary investigation has determined that in the 13th century the ancestors of modern Ossets, the Alans..."

These four people are the most well-known figures from among the 76 prisoners who were arrested on political grounds. In the past few days this number has been complimented by participants of meetings and demonstrations in Tbilisi. Many people have been wounded and five have died. Rumours spread through Tbilisi at lightning speed, despite the banning of Central Television broadcasts, while Georgian TV offers nothing but Gamsakhurdia's speeches and enthusiastic assurances of support. Sometimes people living in Tbilisi learn about the events in their own city from the broadcasts of Radio Liberty or simply ring up friends in other republics who can watch Russian TV's *Vesti* news programme and Central TV's *TSN* night news. Moscow-based newspapers have long been unavailable in Tbilisi, while the newspaper *Svobodnaya Gruzia*, which became bolder for a couple of days in September, has once again turned into an official publication loyal to the government.

The Red Berets

It may be interesting to trace the changes that have occurred in the National Guard of Georgia. The National Guard was formed in the winter of 1991 when the Southern Ossetian conflict was in full swing, but actual fighting in Southern Ossetia was nonetheless the mission of regular police units and armed volunteers. As for the National Guard, its mission was more important: to defend the regime and President Gamsakhurdia personally.

The red berets were a must at all official ceremonies and the cult of the National Guard was an element of the cult of Gamsakhurdia. However, during the August putsch in Moscow, the President had to sacrifice his Guard. 10,000 guardsmen followed the fired NG commander Tengiz Kitovani and when Kitovani returned to Tbilisi on September 5 he enjoyed a substantial preponderance in manpower.

At that time the NG commander could have seized the President and given him over to the opposition as a gift. The opposition parties refused to consider this option: not out of love for Gamsakhurdia of course, but because they did not want to create a precedent, thus starting a series of military coups in the republic. Besides, in the event of a favourable takeover, it would have become impossible to either disarm the guardsmen of Kitovani (he had been in the Gamsakhurdia team and therefore the opposition has little trust in him) or to withdraw them from Kitovani's orders. On the request of the opposition the guardsmen withdrew from the city to Shavnabada where they spent nearly a fortnight, their sheer presence near the city serving as a guarantee of the opposition's immunity. During that time the National Guard started growing weaker. Kitovani allowed the unreliable guardsmen who had been drafted into the NG instead of the Soviet army to go, but kept volunteer officers and enlisted men. However, even this measure could not prevent some guardsmen from deserting.

The absence of any radical changes and even the freezing of the situation in Tbilisi, a city divided in two, combined with mounting unrest in the barracks, moved the National Guard and its commander to take some resolute steps. On September 22 when Tengiz Sigua, former prime minister turned opposition leader, decided to speak to the nation over Georgian TV, the supporting National Guard attacked and took over the TV Centre. After that the con-

flict intensified and on the same night crowds of fanatics who arrived from the provinces heeding Gamsakhurdia's summons destroyed the barricades erected by the opposition in Tbilisi's main street and ransacked the headquarters of the National Congress and its member-parties. Some members of the National Independence Party who sought refuge at the NC headquarters were severely beaten up (rumours had it that one teenager was thrown out of the window and died). The defenders could not put up any serious resistance because they had been weakened by the hunger strike that had already lasted for many days.

That night Gamsakhurdia managed to resume control over Rustaveli Prospekt and the centre of opposition manifestations moved closer to the TV Centre controlled by the Koitvani guardsmen. Covered by several artillery pieces, the opposition meeting outside the TV Centre lasted for a week and a half. Once again the National Guardsmen became heroes, and Kitovani the hero of heroes. However, the strengthening of the NG commander's position in the opposition camp was a Pyrrhic victory. Occasional armed clashes and shootouts with no apparent reason as well as the death of several policemen and guardsmen made the initially sympathetic population less friendly to the opposition. Even some opposition members' acting as a living shield separating the conflicting sides during the shootouts outside the TV Centre could not conceal what the situation really was: an open mutiny of the National Guard against the President and parliament. Thus the image of the National Guard as a force preventing violence faded.

President's back in control

After the clashes between the National Guard and the forces loyal to Gamsakhurdia the authority of the NG and the opposition it supported plummeted. On the other

hand, the authority of Gamsakhurdia, who was seen as the person who had eliminated the threat of civil war, soared. After the two weeks of confrontation the situation could not have failed to change to the benefit of Gamsakhurdia. Both the opposition and the National Guard realized this. So did the President, it seemed.

Finally, following some lengthy negotiations on the evening of October 3 several hundred guardsmen who remained loyal to Kitovani withdrew from Tbilisi and camped by the so-called Sea of Tbilisi reservoir 15 kilometres away from the capital. The armed members of the Merab Kostava Society who had been guarding the home of their chairman, Vazha Adamiya, quietly withdrew in another direction. Both contingents were allowed to leave the city freely, but in the morning of the following day they found themselves encircled and isolated by the government forces. Radio and television broadcasts, already back under presidential control, informed the population that Kitovani guardsmen attacked a police station at 10 a.m. The government forces did not allow either the press or ambulances access to the area of the clashes: "You will be killed there. Our troops are shooting and bombing there..." Opposition sources reported that the government forces included the OMON special-purpose police, NG units loyal to the President and volunteers from Checheno-Ingushetia. Soon Gamsakhurdia appeared on TV and refuted the rumours that citizens of Russia were involved in the operation. As for the opposition, it reported that four wounded men who spoke neither Georgian nor Russian had been admitted to a Tbilisi hospital. Fifteen minutes later a group of Interior Ministry officers took the mysterious foursome to a police hospital and destroyed all documents about the patients' admittance. However, the opposition version that the four might have been Ingushes is highly improbable: the Ingushes speak Russian as their second language.

The alarmed population of Tbilisi took to the streets once again. Every

fifteen minutes calls were broadcast over the radio urging the people to defend the House of the Government. As for the information about the opposition meeting, it was passed from person to person orally. Opposition followers headed for the House of the Government down Rustaveli Prospekt and immediately confrontation started. Rumours circulated among the opposition members that two journalists had been beaten up by plainclothes policemen. Then groups of young opposition followers started beating some people from the opposing side whom they identified as KGB and police agents. The Gamsakhurdia followers made no attempt to rescue their people even after the beatings began.

At the same time, a large group of members of the National Democratic Party led by Chanturia's wife, Irina Sarishvili, freed the headquarters of their party. It seemed that the political situation in Tbilisi returned to what it had been before the takeover of the TV Centre. However, at 1.30 a.m. on October 5, OMON troopers and National Guardsmen loyal to Gamsakhurdia, augmented by an armour personnel carrier and some fire-fighting vehicles, mounted a counterattack from the House of the Government. First the APC heavy machine gun sent a volley of fire over the crowds and

then the OMON opened fire. This crazy attack resulted in two deaths. According to official information, over 70 people were wounded or beaten up, but the number of victims must actually be much higher — many people preferred not to receive medical assistance. As for Kitovani, he refused to return to Tbilisi demanding a written request of interference from the opposition deputies of the Supreme Soviet.

Several days later Gamsakhurdia declared the events a communist putsch and said he was prepared to cooperate with the opposition. The Supreme Soviet approved Gamsakhurdia's orders to impose a state of emergency in Tbilisi. However, most of the time was spent on the discussion of one issue: whether Communist deputies were to be expelled from the Supreme Soviet as organizers of the unrest, as Gamsakhurdia called them. 60 deputies were stripped of their mandates as representatives of a party that does not exist.

...The telephone rings.

"Any news?"

"Everything's calm."

"Any shooting?"

"Occasionally. But the night was calm generally."

The hills of Georgia are veiled in

The dark of the night...

And dawn is still a long time off...

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The last call-up

The professional army is now the talk of the town. But is it really practicable?

*Vadim Makarenko and
Dmitry Trenin*

As had often been the case it is the opponents of reform that create conditions for a major breakthrough. The conservative upper crust of the army has produced its last and most weighty argument — tanks in Moscow streets — in favour of an urgent radical military reform. What democratic deputies and the radically-minded military have been urging for three years has been effected by their opponents over a mere three days.

Contracts instead of conscription

The first step has already been made: the army is departified and depoliticized. On the USSR President's decree an ad hoc commission on military reform has been set up and a package of measures drafted to reform the armed forces prepared. Of paramount importance now is the problem of recruitment.

The August developments suddenly revived the worn-out slogan "The people and the Army are One" which had already ceased to make sense. It appeared that the armed forces were not a closed institution fenced off from civil society, otherwise the August developments would have taken a different turn.

Conscription embodies the link which unites society and the army although such liaison does not always imply harmony. Outstanding problems that were piling up in the army now manifest themselves in brutality towards young recruits, negligence of servicemen's health, ethnic conflicts and the like. This is why the public is demanding radical reform of the armed forces.

It is believed that the conscript army should be replaced with a volunteer army of professionals. The former high command of the military establishment held on to the all-out conscription principle. It may be inferred from statements of the new defence minister that the military are now heading for a mixed service pattern

of the German type: conscription — service on contract — professional service.

Is there any hurry?

The advantages of voluntary enlistment are evident: since there is no coercion regional military committees will not have

whom exactly? Who is going to attack the USSR? We cannot say that the young generation in the USSR will wholly opt for Pepsi but we would like to know how many young men and women (today the army cannot do without them) will choose khaki.

After the war, West Germany planned to build up a volunteer army to avoid the remilitarization of society. But half a year later the parliament had to adopt a draft law: there were hardly enough volunteers among the Germans "born soldiers." It may be that the USSR either will have to call up rather than enlist volunteers.

One may object that the number of



How much will they charge for marching voluntarily?

to "chase" conscripts, discipline can be easily maintained, and military hardware not damaged because of lack of competence. In a combat situation one volunteer will be as good as three conscript soldiers and they will be paid for the risk taken accordingly.

The advantages are indubitable. But in order to make use of them several conditions should be met, most importantly there should be a sufficient number of prospective volunteers and relevant finances. Can they be met today or tomorrow?

The main character of a popular movie of the 1970s used to say: "Defending one's Motherland is a profession." The reference was to the officers but in a volunteer army all should be professionals. Now the thesis of defending the Motherland meets in most cases with an immediate reaction: defending it from

volunteers will largely depend on how much they are paid. When speaking about big resources analysts usually refer to the redistribution of resources within the military budget (from hardware to people). Some point out that a large (two- or threefold) curtailment of the personnel is expected. But it is most probable that the share of military spending in the state budget will drop drastically in the near future, and the army personnel will face the challenge of nurses and teachers as regards their pay. As regards military hardware, the new generation of "smart" weapons systems will not be cheaper than the armour. Some hope that the volunteer army will be kept afloat by the expected surplus labour but one should not make recruitment pattern dependent on concrete economic situation in the country.

Draftees on a payroll

Democracy and a volunteer army are by no means twins. Given social instability and economic upheavals (both are almost guaranteed in the USSR), a professional army can become an independent political institution like it was in the Weimar Republic with the 100,000-strong Reichswehr. So, there are more questions than answers. Maybe it will pay if we do not skip the intermediate stage — mixed recruitment?

The regular call-up to military service has already been announced. Despite the new Defence Minister's decision not

will have to restore society's confidence in the army.

Some solutions are obvious. As long as there are hotspots in the country, parents will want to be sure that their boys are not sent there. Incidentally, the French units with the Allied Command in the Persian Gulf were a hundred-percent professionals. If Moscow is to form a peace-keeping force to be engaged within its military strategic space, it should employ only professionals for this purpose.

What is needed next is effective parliamentary control to enforce human

allowance of men in active service should not be lower than average wages and salaries — military service is not easy. Today the Soviet soldier not only has no money — he has no right to a home leave during his two-year service, he is not even guaranteed a short leave on weekends. On the other hand, this is not only a matter of social justice. Such allowances, officially on record with the military budget, will go to the benefit of young men rather than to the Moloch of the arms race. Investment in youth is most beneficial to society: by helping young people to make a good start society provides for its future. In view of the pending armed forces reduction such assistance may amount to three to four billion rubles, which is quite a sum but essentially cheaper than the volunteer enlistment.

Finally, a democratic law should be adopted on the legal status of servicemen to specify their rights and the government's obligations to them. It is essential that the wording of the oath be amended and a constitutional provision made to forbid employment of the armed forces against their own people and in other cases not envisaged by the law or in violation of the established procedure. This will allow servicemen to decide whether the order they are given is in compliance with the Constitution and the law, and disobey it if it is not. In addition, it will be possible to prosecute those who follow such orders.

* * *

These measures will raise the prestige of military service which is still compulsory, and make it safer for citizens and society as a whole. Military reform is of prime importance to the whole country, especially in an army like the Soviet one. The military alone will not cope with it. Best minds of science, culture and the church should help bring the army to society's needs, including the spiritual needs of those in service. The reform must be started immediately. The army withstood the test of the August developments, but who knows if this test was the last one.



to call up students the discussion continues. But is conscription really the matter in dispute? The democratic United States has long abrogated it. So did Great Britain, even earlier than the US, and Japan has not adopted it at all since the war. On the other hand, Germany, France and Italy which are no less democratic retain this pattern of recruiting. So do the Scandinavian countries. Conscription is in effect but it is hardly a problem. The matter possibly is not so much in the pattern of recruitment as in the army itself.

In other words, what is important is not **on what basis** one is to serve — by contract or by law — but **where**. The primary task of military reformers in the USSR is to make military service acceptable for society, and for this they

rights in the armed forces. This should belong with parliamentary committees on defence, security, and youth problems. But not them alone. For instance, Germans maintain a special line of control which is authorized by a Bundestag commissioner for defence. This officer, who is responsible only to the Parliament, is plenipotentiary in matters concerning the civil rights of servicemen. Instituting a similar control body in the USSR would guarantee that the recently adopted Declaration on Human Rights and Freedoms will become effective in the army, too, and put an end to numerous infringements that are still common in the armed forces.

The material position of soldiers in active service should be reconsidered and radically improved. The monetary

Treaty with state "X"?

The quiet diplomatic drama concurrent with the breaking up of the Union

In Prague the text of the new Soviet-Czecho-Slovak Agreement on good-neighbourly friendly relations and cooperation has been agreed upon. It seems there is a gleam of light at the end of the tunnel which the sides have been feeling their way through for almost a year. The preparation of the new treaties of the USSR with countries of Eastern Europe began long before the final death knell of the Warsaw Pact, when it became clear that any attempt to reanimate it with a new face would be senseless.

Were there any such attempts? That can not be excluded. The Soviet *perestroika* and new thinking in the second half of the 1980s gave rise to the hope that there would be general movement of the then "socialist camp" countries to European unity. In France's capital the concept of "concentric circles" was even born. According to this idea first the countries of the EFTA representing an inner circle, and then the ex-Comecon states would unite with the EC, the core of a united Europe. Having become unaccustomed in the postwar years to serious internecine troubles and conflicts, the West hoped for a peaceful, step-by-step return of the "prodigal children" to the bosom of European civilization. However, this was not to be.

The national contradictions, worsening economic crisis, skidding reforms in the USSR, and the consequent fuzziness of foreign policy and different rates and directions of post-totalitarian processes led to the break up of an area which had earlier seemed united. The region split into the "radical North," which consisted of countries (Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary) that were making an attempt to once again turn their face to Europe; and the "conservative South" (Romania, Bulgaria, countries which until the revolutions occurred there had neither the experience nor the mentality for such a turnaround.

To which group did the pre-August 1991 USSR belong? Most likely to the "conservative South," if you consider, for instance, the attempt to conclude the heavy old "sanitary cordon thinking" treaty with Romania. The countries of the radical North categorically refused to sign such treaties. What did they want? Havel, the President of Czecho-Slovakia, said in an interview with a reporter of the CTK on the eve of the signing of the Act on the Disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization that he expected there to be "equal rights in relations between countries of the former Soviet bloc," and "the beginning of a new historical era in the life of all Europe." The Polish weekly *Polityka* wrote at the end of August of the hope that the new treaty would "guarantee the right to flexibility and search for common values in the sphere of culture, economics and the civilization achievements in forming relations of partnership and mutual benefit." Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall declared at the end of May that "Hungary naturally insists on its sovereignty and would like to conclude a treaty which in the future, no matter what happens, could not limit its freedom of action to unite with the transformed European Community." Of course, with such expectations the treaties proposed by the Soviet side containing the phrase the "hostile NATO countries" simple did not answer such hopes and the European reality.

How should the state-heir of the USSR, increasingly referred to simply as a "space," be viewed today? It does not fit in with the "radical North," nor the "conservative South." The tragedy and peculiarity of the situation lay in the fact that the abbreviation USSR in the headings of the new treaties with the countries of the former Eastern Europe, is now associated with the former "Big Eastern Neighbour," a large part of the republics and regions of which now have their own independent contacts with the

former partners of Comecon and Warsaw Treaty Organization. And in general, the history of diplomacy has never known a case of signing a treaty with a "space." The indecisiveness and incompetency of officialdom has lead to an absurd situation.

One of the biographers of President Wilson, David Jacobs, characterizing the role of Russia on the eve of World War I, wrote that Russia was generally in "poor shape" and its manpower endless, so European nations continued to seek alliance while they laughed behind Russia's back. Today, after a long "social experiment" and in a relatively peaceful time, "our space" is worse off than ever and everyone is trying to abandon it, taking with them something "for the road." Nevertheless, signing new treaties with the former partners of WTO must not be put off. However, whatever the new USSR will be called, the conclusion with its neighbours of treaties free from ideological tinsel and oaths of loyalty to the principles of "proletarian internationalism," "class solidarity," "eternal and indestructible friendship" and "anti-imperialist unity of action" will relieve them of the fear for their fate if there are new cataclysms on Soviet territory. It was not at all accidental that during those August days of the coup the commentary on the events in Moscow was accompanied in the West by a prognosis on the fate of the former satellite countries.

As a result of signing the new treaties — and this process began, it seems, in Prague — Eastern Europe will most likely become yet again a European "middle-ground" and its tradition of two sided orientation will be revived. And here arises the natural question of the possibility of its leaning towards the West. With the deepening economic crisis and the progressing political instability in the Union, the pragmatic desire of the small European states is perfectly logical. The more so since it is on the western part of the continent that all the most viable and influential economic and military-political



Drawing from Dialog magazine (Germany)

organizations — CE, EC, NATO and to some degree WEU are concentrated today. Small states need defence and guarantees.

Nevertheless, the decades of "brotherly mutual assistance" left their imprint on the relations of the Union with its western neighbours. The decades of ties with the Soviet economy not disappear without a trace. The USSR was almost the only supplier of raw materials and energy to the other Comecon countries and at the same time almost the only consumer of its products which are not competitive with those of the developed countries. And there is no sentimentality when it comes to competition.

Thus, for some time the Soviet market will remain the main one for the countries of the "middleground." Especially if the West goes along with the request of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland to give credits to the USSR only if it buys from Eastern Europe, thus killing two birds with one stone: economic support for the threesome and feeding us.

Here it must be said that having planned the transfer of mutual relations with the former Comecon countries to market basis, the settlements at world prices and hard currency were unfeasible not only because of lack of money, but also be-

cause of the uncontrollable process of the USSR's disintegration. All our potential economic partners say that they do not know with whom to do business. They try to receive the necessary fuel and energy by barter through the recently created trade houses, joint banks, payment agreements or clearing, and conclude contracts directly with the republics, regions and enterprises. And though business is developing, the prognosis for trade turnover in the near future is not comforting. On the average it is less than half, and in the best cases, two thirds of the past volume for the East European countries. The exchange of information has become complicated and personal contacts reduced. It has reached the point that on the border with Hungary beginning the first of October they make the already behumbed Soviet citizen turn his pockets inside out to check for dollars to pay for his stay. The black marketeer, of course, can find a way around anything. But what about the Hungarians living in Transcarpathia? How will they visit their relatives abroad now? The Soviet parliamentarians should be given rubles for their trips. Let them feel what it is like to be a Transcarpathian tourist.

What can we expect from the signing of the new treaties "on good-neighbourli-

ness, friendly relations and cooperation"? First of all, a total rejection of the elements of inequality in all the former treaties. Any treaty between states at different levels of development and having different potentials has always meant a certain asymmetry. According to the new agreements, each side has the right to act on the basis of its own criteria of safety and to choose its own allies.

Also the concept of political-ideological cooperation is no longer to be part of the mutual relations. The ties and contacts between the analogous parties of various countries will develop only as part of the common European infrastructure.

A new feature in the interaction is the rights given to ethnic minorities living on contiguous territories. Until recently this did not figure into our negotiations at all.

One can assume that in the future the development of the central European region will involve for the most part not only bilateral relations, but also expansion of regional integration and cooperation. It is entirely possible that after the inclusion of Poland into the former Danube-Adriatic Union it will grow into the transcontinental Baltic-Adriatic Union. As far back as 1988 such routes of development were discussed at the meetings of socialist and social-democratic parties of Italy, Hungary and Finland. By the way, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belorussia and the Ukraine, as well as north western regions of the RSFSR may join separate programmes of the Hexagonale, such as a communications, information, energy, and cultural projects. Poland and Finland have already been meeting their energy requirements through the North-Western USSR energy network which all the above mentioned are part of, except for the Ukraine.

Bulgaria and Romania will probably try to create a Black Sea group of cooperation. This is entirely possible if the idea takes root.

In any case, the forms and nature of cooperation of the future Union and republics with the former countries of the socialist bloc will be determined by economic interests and not ideological or military-political principles.

Lyubov Shishelina
Cand. Sc. (Hist.)

"We are poor, but boundlessly ambitious"

The last interview of the permanent representative

Egidijus BICKAUSKAS, permanent representative of the government of the Lithuanian Republic to Moscow, grants an interview to *New Times* correspondent **Alexander Chudodoyev**. Egidijus Bickauskas has played a considerable part in making Lithuania a free nation recognized by all other states.

New Times. A dream has come true: Lithuania has become a fully independent state. But now you will be called to account, and no allowances will be made. Why, do you think, such national minorities as Poles and Russians feel worried in your new democratic state?

Egidijus Bickauskas. National minorities legislation adopted in Lithuania conforms in full to all the existing international norms.

N.T. Why then are the Poles dissatisfied?

E.B. Naturally, the Polish problem does exist in the republic. Our major mistake was that after the proclamation of our independence we did not pay due attention to the Poles' demands and overlooked the fact that we Lithuanians, once the Soviet Union's national minority, now represent the republic's majority. Poles, having become a national minority in Lithuania, began to fear, though groundlessly, for their future. The events to come have been orchestrated according to the notorious divide-and-conquer scenario not infrequently resorted to by various empires. The CPSU has worked out that areas populated by national minorities can be convenient places for fomenting provocations. For example, Mr Shenin, a CC CPSU Politburo member, visited Lithuania right after the January events. And he chose for his communist prayers not big cities which are inhabited mainly by Lithuanians, but the localities populated mostly by Russians and Poles. The purpose of his endeavours was quite obvious — to create a seat of tension there. Having taken advantage of our mistakes, Communists managed to artificially create the Polish problem.

N.T. What mistakes have been made by Vilnius with respect to national minorities?

E.B. I think that the Lithuanian laws on national minorities are just and fair. But I personally would have given national minorities much more than they asked for. Since they got what they wanted a year ago, national minorities are now making new demands. Moreover, one should bear in mind the historically marred relations between Lithuania and Poland. Take, for example, the problem of the Vilnius area occupied by Poland in 1920. Though Warsaw now has no territorial claims to Vilnius, there are some politicians both in Poland and Lithuania, who are still toying with the idea. Lithuanians cannot overcome the fear of losing their lands, while Poles start to entertain revanchist ideas.

N.T. Are there any other border disputes?

E.B. Lithuania lays no territorial claims to anybody and vice versa. I am very glad that the Byelorussian leaders gave up their claims to us, though not long ago Minsk, on Moscow's initiative, tried very hard to do this.

N.T. And what about Germany?

E.B. We have no common border with Germany. If you refer to Klaipeda, it should be remembered that at the Nuremberg trial Germany was presented with an indictment in this regard. Generally speaking, I think that the time has passed for making territorial claims.

N.T. Would you say a few words about the granting of citizenship, especially to Russian-speaking population?

E.B. Any citizen — irrespective of his or her nationality, faith, and so on — permanently residing on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic has the right to Lithuanian citizenship (as stipulated by the Law on Citizenship adopted on November 3, 1989). Moreover, under a treaty with Russia, this provision is also valid for those Russians who came to the republic after the specified date and for military men (and their families) serving in the armed forces stationed on our territory. We won't force Lithuanian citizenship on anyone. Those who are not willing to be citizens of the Lithuanian Republic may continue to live in Lithuania, though they will be deprived of certain

political rights as is the case all over the world. I would stress once again that no one's rights and freedoms will be infringed upon in free Lithuania.

N.T. Do you grant dual citizenship?

E.B. No. It is possible only in special cases.

N.T. After the USSR and Lithuania establish diplomatic relations, will we need visas to visit Vilnius?

E.B. I presume that a regular visa system as accepted worldwide will be introduced in the republic, though the very procedure, at least initially, will be considerably simplified.

N.T. As I see it, Lithuania now has every opportunity for carrying out radical reforms. Why don't you take the chance?

E.B. You are not right here, for changes are being carried out, although not as rapidly as required. We have already taken first steps towards a free market economy and free prices. The process of privatization is also in full swing. People need time to realize that they live in another society, that the very way of life, their ideas and habits should be changed as well. They fear for their future and this fear paralyzes their activities and will. I also am not absolutely confident of what awaits all of us.

N.T. May I ask you what your salary is?

E.B. My wages amount to 1,050 rubles, it's enough for me... But my colleagues get much less. I'd say that we are all very poor, but boundlessly ambitious. I think this will be our common trouble for quite a long time.

N.T. When is Lithuania going to introduce its own currency?

E.B. The introduction of Lits is already envisaged, but I cannot say when. Not this year, anyway.

N.T. How would you describe your current relations with Moscow?


E.B. I am under the impression that quite a number of Union leaders have not yet realized that we are an independent state.

N.T. And what about your leaders? Have they gotten used to the idea that Moscow is the seat of a foreign government?

E.B. Both the USSR and Lithuania now face a complicated situation. The traditionally established ties should not be severed right away, this would be unwise. But they should be altered, for which purpose it is very expedient to change our and your leaders' thinking, especially that of Moscow business man-



Soviet Army units are getting ready to leave Lithuania



Vytautas Landsbergis and Egidijus Bickauskas

agers. Recently I have read the text of a new food agreement for 1992. It has been worked out according to the old pattern: all fifteen republics have been reduced to the same level. It is high time for certain Moscow leaders to understand that in interstate relations even the form is of great importance.

N.T. Eduard Shevardnadze has been appointed head of the USSR delegation which is to attend negotiations with Lithuania. What kind of negotiations will these be?

E.B. For example, we will discuss the time limit for the Soviet Army troops' withdrawal from Lithuanian territory. In addition, we must decide what should be done with the Union property located on the territory of Lithuania. We are also very eager to get our archive and cultural treasures back from the USSR.

N.T. A few days ago Vytautas Landsber-

gis informed the USSR Defence Minister that he saw no subject for negotiations when the status of Soviet Army units in Lithuania is concerned. What is your opinion on the problem?

E.B. Obviously, negotiating parties should first of all discuss the procedure and term of the Soviet troops' withdrawal from the territory of the independent state. Though I understand the Vilnius garrison officers who declared that they would not withdraw their units until they were provided with adequate living conditions at new places of service. The problem is not ours, but Lithuania should take it into consideration.

N.T. Will Lithuania help the USSR pay its debts to the world community?

E.B. I don't think so. Do you know of any state which, after having been occupied, pays its occupiers' debts? On the other hand, Lithuania might agree to repay the

Union debts for its enterprises which got credits but did not repay them.

N.T. Will Lithuania have its own army?

E.B. I do not like the word "army." We don't need an army, we need self-defence forces: frontier guards, prison guards, etc. — tens of thousands of men, not more. Probably the first call-up will be made this year.

N.T. Are there any new facts with regard to the Medininkai tragedy?

E.B. Practically only one version is worth mentioning, many others proved to be unfounded. Most likely the customs officials were killed by a group belonging to some military structures of the Soviet Union. The investigation has been hampered by the August

putsch. Just a few days before the coup the law-enforcement officers of Lithuania met with a man who refused to give his name. He had some information to share, and another meeting was to take place somewhat later. But the putsch scared the man off. If he is alive, we would like to meet him. His security is certainly guaranteed.

N.T. Will the Lithuanian Procurator's Office level its own accusations against certain members of the State Emergency Committee?

E.B. The investigation will show. As far as I know, an understanding has been reached with the General Procurators of the USSR and the Russian Federation to the effect that Lithuania would have access to all the necessary information. Besides, Union and Russian law enforcement bodies might help us track those involved in the January events in Lithuania. They managed to go underground after the putsch and are, according to the information available, apparently in Moscow. We do not want to make short work of them, but they ought to appear in court and be punished.

N.T. Do you think you will be appointed Ambassador of Lithuania to Moscow?

E.B. The Lithuanian parliament does not approve of deputies working as ambassadors in other countries. I think this is good. Moreover, some people in Lithuania hold a grudge against me for being too "liberal" in my relations with the Centre. But speaking honestly, as my colleagues and I have achieved so much and gone through so much here in Moscow, I would like very much to present my credentials...

The "informal" sector is brought out into the open

Three-fourths of able-bodied Peruvians are out of work or have part-time jobs. Nevertheless, they do not ransack supermarkets or office buildings. "A social explosion in Peru is held back thanks to the informal (or 'shadow') sector of the economy," Justo Orellana, president of the Federation of Small Enterprises, asserts. "The growth of this sector is a sort of physiological reaction of society to the government's failure to fulfil its obligations. If this sector did not exist the masses of people would die of hunger or a revolution would begin. And so, instead of complaining, Peruvians are adapting themselves to the present conditions. Besides, there is no clear-cut boundary between the informal and formal sectors of the economy. To one or another degree, all Peruvians, the government included, are involved in the informal sector."

"Informals" in government posts

The opinion of Justo Orellana, shared by almost everyone in Peru, may seem paradoxical. The "shadow economy" is indeed a worldwide phenomenon. However, hardly anywhere can one find so many ardent champions of it. In the United States the illegal, even if innocent, workshops secretly operating in garrets or basements are usually run by the mafia, drug pushers or pimps, that is, criminals. They also have ties and sprawling enterprises. However, in a mature, civilized market economy a sock manufacturer, for instance, would do better to operate within legal bounds.

The situation is different

in Latin American countries where a market economy is still taking shape. A group of researchers, formed by Peruvian businessman Hernando de Soto, tried for the sake of an experiment to register an ordinary sewing workshop. They spent 289 days and 1,231 dollars for this purpose. Bribes to officials were given only as a last resort when the matter came to a dead end. Peru has about half a million laws and departmental instructions, often contradicting one another. This gives a free hand to unscrupulous government officials, inciting them to take an "informal" attitude towards applicants.

This attitude was explained to me by a Brazilian businessman. "Just imagine," he said, "that one of the applicants is going

to make a lot of money. Why should you give him permission to start a business for nothing? When I estimate how much will be spent on a business I lay aside ten percent of the expenditure for bribes."

Justo Orellana also understands the desire of government officials. Nevertheless, he fiercely opposes government interference in the economy and energetically defends the "shadow" private dealers. He champions economic freedom which many philosophers regard as the basis of all other freedoms. In their opinion, the lack of broad democracy in the economy is not compensated for by political democracy and is the main reason for backwardness and poverty.

There is no boundless freedom, however, and the possible degree of it is determined by the maturity of society. The lack of freedom in economic activity engenders "informals" both among the government bureaucracy and the population. Both types of "informals," like dialectical opposites, are in a state of conflict and unity. It is a sort of addition to the well-known formula about the readiness of capital to go to any lengths when a high rate of profit can be ensured. A government official is not any better, however. He is no less beset by temptations and can succumb to them more easily.

So if the government begins to control prices, a modestly paid official in charge of them can get millions in bribes for only one percent increase of just one of them.

Ricardo Letts, a member of parliament, told me how widely officials can violate the laws in Peru, where, as Justo Orellana said, "the informal attitude prevails."



"Informal" petty traders and vendors in the streets of Lima

Photo by the author

Once Letts learned from a reliable source and informed President Fujimori that a cabinet minister had taken a bribe. "Can you prove that?" the President asked. "No, I can't, but I hope that you believe me." Alberto Fujimori replied that he believed Letts and asked a question the latter regards as worthy of recounting. Rejecting the idea of dismissing the minister concerned, the President noted: "Who in our country has not once done anything of the kind?"

Such a condescending attitude does not fit with Fujimori's image created during the election campaign. Rather young politicians, far removed from power centres until recently, have lately taken high posts in Latin America. They attracted the voters by promising to raise the moral standards of government officials. However, this problem cannot be solved by personnel changes and police methods only.

"Informals" in the street

It does not take much time to find those whom Justo Orellana defends. The sidewalks along almost all main streets of Lima are covered with rags with all kinds of articles set out on them. Vendors and cargo pedicabs move about the city, silently or noisily offering their goods and services: bananas, the exchange of dollars, and the cleaning of sewer pipes.

It cannot be said that "informals" get nothing from the state. Lamps illumine streets for them as for other citizens, and the children of many "informals" go to school. However, the state also gets something from "informals." They evade direct taxes but pay indirect ones when they buy beer or a cinema ticket.

Most important, however, is the contribution of "informals" to Peru's economic growth. Half the houses in Lima have been built by "informals." They control 95 percent of public transport and 274 of the 331 city markets. More instances could be given here. Persecution of "informals," as prac-

tised earlier, would harm the economy as a whole. "Informal traders," plumbers or craftsmen do not get from "informal" manufacturers everything they need and receive credits in "informal" banks (there are such banks as well). Legal companies also give a noticeable part of their products to "informals." In this way they create tax privileges for themselves in order to survive the hard time of the crisis.

I shall not give more facts to prove that anarchy sometimes brings order in the economy. The "informal" sector is an evil, of course. Economic activity must be under public control and yield revenue to the treasury. In the given case, however, private "informals" are an inevitable evil, justifiable and useful in a way. As for the "informal" activity of government employees it also has a positive aspect, helping the low-paid employees to raise their living standards. Only one of the feasible means of eliminating the evil of "informal" activity seems most effective. It would be best of all to curtail the rights of government officials.

This is what the Peruvian government is doing. Privatization, the lowering of custom barriers, and other market-boosting measures are opening new opportunities for enterprising citizens and making them less dependent on officials. In addition to freedom, direct government aid and its fair distribution are needed so that a lucky Peruvian can become a legal micro-businessman. This, again, depends on the moral standards of society and its services.

In this way the Peruvians will gradually accommodate themselves to the law. The nation will begin to grow richer little by little, also thanks to the efforts of former migrants who will act more successfully if new opportunities open for them. The citizens will gradually learn to respect the law. It will be so because, among other things, officials will find it increasingly difficult and less lucrative to abuse their powers.

Vitaly Sobolev
LIMA - MOSCOW

Soviet Journal of International Law (SJIL)

a new journal of international law (est. 1991) appears four times a year in Russian and English

SJIL

— articles on topical problems of international public and private law

SJIL

— information about latest international legal documents and Soviet laws and regulations concerning various spheres of international cooperation

SJIL

— generalized information about trials and trials of arbitration of cases with foreign participants, experience of cooperation of Soviet enterprises with foreign partners and joint ventures

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Too little gold

The total amount of gold excavated during the eight thousand years of mankind's using it is about 100,000 tonnes

While people are killed for gold, gold itself virtually cannot be destroyed. It does not oxidize and can only be dissolved in the cocktail of two thirds hydrochloric acid and one third nitric acid. Gold is necessary in everything from electronics to jewelry, and in a variety of forms from micron-thin slices to 16-kilogramme ingots. Going to endless trouble to extract gold from the bowels of the earth people then buried it themselves as jewelry and toothcaps on the dead. After that archeologists or grave diggers would step in and the cycle would repeat itself...

Gold has served as a principal means of hoarding to provide its owners with a reliable and compact means of capital shelter. Today, for instance, central banks of Western countries possess gold bullions of 40,000 tonnes. The steel vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank of the US in Manhattan accommodate 10,000 tonnes of gold. This amount is the property of eighty state banks and the International Monetary Fund, which prefer to use the FRB for two reasons: stability (wars and revolutions seem realistic in almost any state but the USA; and the generosity of the FRB which does not charge its depositors anything for keeping their gold. However, the US government prefers to keep the gold reserve of the United States in another place: the Fort Knox military base.

Speculation on the fluctuations in the price of gold is a centuries-old business. However, this business' hour of triumph came on January 21, 1980, when the price of gold soared to US\$ 875 per troy ounce (31,103 grams). During the period before that record-breaking price increase the price of gold was stable at about US\$ 600. There were several reasons for the price boost, but the main one was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting aggravation of international tensions. As Karl Marx put it, wars always make capital seek a safe haven as well as high profits. Last autumn, as the war in the Persian Gulf was approaching, the price of gold went up from the regular US\$ 350 per troy ounce to US\$ 410. However, as soon as Operation Desert

Storm laid waste to the Iraqi military machine, the situation on the gold market returned to normal.

"Gold is the metal of speculation," explained Olle Johansson, "and as a rule the price of gold is determined by the influence of psychological factors. The possession of gold does not bring any interest to the owner, that is why gold speculators speculate for a rise in its price. The United States' quick victory over Iraq was a hard blow to many dealers who for some time stopped their speculations with gold."


The chief of "the gold department" of Boliden International Trading, Olle Johansson, is familiar with the subtleties of gold trading. The Swedish concern extracts small amounts of gold and takes an active part in the international gold trade.

"Today the world gold market is relatively stable," said Olle Johansson, echoing the opinion of most Western experts. "We do not expect any serious drop or increase in the price of gold within the coming year or two."

Western central banks do not want any serious monetary shocks and in case of "psychological" increases of the price of gold, they may start selling some gold from their deposits. However, the price of gold cannot decrease considerably either, because gold mining is becoming increasingly unprofitable and in two major gold producers — the Soviet Union and South Africa — gold production is being hindered for political reasons.

According to the latest available data, the production of gold in 1989 amounted to 1,653 tonnes in the West: 607 tonnes in South Africa, 259 tonnes in the US, 197 tonnes in Au-

A BULL THAT LOVES BAD NEWS



The diagram of a change in the price of gold from the American magazine *Fortune* shows: the gold market promptly responds to political cataclysms (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq) and changes in the economic situation (increase in the price of oil, growing debts of the developing countries)

stralia, 158 tonnes in Canada, 97 tons in Brazil... The Soviet Union and China have so far been reluctant to disclose their gold production statistics.

However, analysts in London, the world centre of gold trade, believe that for a rather long time the annual production of gold in the Soviet Union was about 300 tonnes. According to Anders Aslund, Director of the Stockholm Institute for East European Economic Studies, Soviet gold production has recently declined to between 180 and 200 tonnes a year. Today's Soviet export of gold is estimated at 300 to 350 tonnes a year, which means that Soviet gold reserves are gradually shrinking. It was only recently that the CIA spoke of a Soviet gold reserve of 2,200 tonnes. Today, however, the estimates are much more modest.

In the unstable 1970s when the price of gold increased several times, producers invested heavily in order to expand production, but actually succeeded in doing this only in the following decade at the expense of unprofitable deposits. However, the gold rush passed and now each new gram of gold is more and more difficult to get. In South Africa gold mines are so deep that cooled air has to be constantly pumped into the shafts to keep the workers fit. In Yakutia, in

the Soviet Union, they are using mammoth drags, while small teams of gold miners tend to split. Gold mining requires new investments. The West seems to have found a way out.

Banks lend gold to mining companies which sell it and finance the production on the money thus raised. In three to ten years the companies return the "gold loans" to the bank plus interest. There is another way as well: producers receive generous financial credits (6 to 12 months in advance) in exchange for selling part of their future output at fixed prices to the banks.

There is no doubt that both ways are acceptable for the Soviet Union as well if we are really concerned about the future of gold mining. Many banks, especially those in the new industrial states of Southeast Asia, dream of hoarding more gold in their vaults and at the same turn their capital to advantage.

All this is quite practicable. Experts unanimously point out that in the 1990s the world production of gold will decline. South Africa, which used to produce two thirds of the world's gold is now barely able to provide even one third. What will happen tomorrow? Many mines in the West have exhausted their largest deposits and are going to be closed down as unprofit-

able. There is every indication that the price of gold will start climbing soon.

Another factor pushing the gold price up is growing industrial production. In 1989 jewelers required a record-breaking amount of gold — 1,811 tonnes or 80 per cent of all the gold offered on international markets. Italy is the leader in this field — 345 tonnes of gold was made into jewelry there in 1989. The jewelers' successes critically depend on the living standards, and despite all fluctuations living standards in the West continue to climb.

133 tonnes of gold was used by the electronic engineering, 49 tonnes by dentists and 62 tonnes was used for gilding. 147 tonnes was made into medals and coins, which are usually purchased not by central banks but by small hoarders, such as firms and individuals seeking stability in conditions of political or financial uncertainty. However, small clients occasionally buy big-time things, too: Australia, for instance, has recently minted a giant coin with a diameter of 75mm and weighing one kilogram. The mammoth coin has the nominal price of \$A 10,000.

Alexander Polyukhov,
our own correspondent
STOCKHOLM

Soviet State Bank: Mining for gold

Who sells off Soviet gold reserves?

In June of this year, official statistics concerning the gold reserves of the Soviet Union were released to the world for the first time, when Alexander Dumnov, a representative of the State Bank of the USSR, said the Soviet gold reserves amounted to 374.5 tonnes.

Immediately after the August putsch, representatives of Russia said they "could not find an unidentified quantity of gold." In other words, the actual amount of gold that Russia possessed fell short of the figure quoted by Dumnov. This piece of news made sensational headlines in *The Guardian*.

At almost the same time *The Guardian* and Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Vneshekonombank, Eduard Gos-

tev, voiced fears about the "uncontrolled sale" of gold by some republics and groups of people. The reaction of the gold market was rather neurotic: the price of gold dropped to the lowest level in the past five years. Dumnov added fuel to the fire when, speaking at a Tokyo conference, he divided the Soviet gold reserves between the State Bank of the USSR and the Vneshekonombank, stressing that the State Bank did not control the entire gold reserves and Soviet gold trade.

When the gold rush started reaching its peak in September, Grigory Yavlinsky said that two thirds of the gold reserves had been sold as early as 1990. The remainder amounted to a mere 240 tonnes. Another 110 tonnes was

mortgaged with no hope of ever coming back.

"I do not know what Yavlinsky means. The Soviet gold reserves remain at the level of 374.5 tonnes," Dumnov snapped back.

Who is right? The opinion of the London headquarters of the World Gold Council is as follows:

Yavlinsky's estimation is closer to the truth. The world data about Soviet gold mortgages, according to various sources, are in the region of 110 to 140 tonnes. At the same time, Yavlinsky's statement seriously undermines trust in the Soviet Union as a solvent state. Yavlinsky's opponents, of course, will offer a more optimistic assessment.

Who dumped the "surplus" gold on the market? There are different versions on this score.

It is known that the Soviet

Union owes over \$30 billion to Germany. DM 16.3 billion out of that figure is due on short-term credits and loans. Gold mortgage is the basis of many short-term credits. The Soviet Union is unable to pay them, and it is possible that Germany has started selling off the mortgaged Soviet gold.

Part of the mortgaged Soviet gold may be flowing into the banks of the Group of Seven. A point to ponder: five tonnes of gold was added to the federal reserve of the United States this summer.

Thus the "new" gold, which touched off a rush on the gold market, might have appeared on the market through non-traditional channels. Gold does not have to be present on the market or be deposited in the credit-issuing bank to send the price soaring: it can remain in Dumnov's vaults while not belonging to Yavlinsky any longer. It can remain in the USSR, but belong to some other owner.

Sergei Babusenko,
our own correspondent
LONDON

Russian cowboys

Soviet Ordnung in the streets of Berlin

The eastern lands of Germany have not seen such an upsurge of economic crime since the time of the Weimar Republic.

Swindlers find people in distress when they call door to door, offering life and property insurance, legal assistance, shares of various companies, promising jobs — all on unprecedentedly profitable terms. However, their promises are nothing but a trap set for the credulous.

The most widespread type of swindling is the promise of easy wealth. The first question usually is: "Why don't you make your money work as people in the West do?" Following that are attractive promises of extremely high interest rates in case the victim's money is securely invested. However... the profits will not be forthcoming earlier than after a couple of years.

According to the Federal Trusteeship Department, this kind of swindling has taken DM one billion from the pockets of East Germans since the time of German unification. The overall damage resulting from economic crimes in the former GDR amounts to DM 5 billion.

Two companies stand out on the long list of firms offering attractive prospects of high profits: Vermögenbildende Sparsysteme GmbH and Ambros based in North Rhine-Westphalia. Criminal police experts believe they have frustrated the greatest swindling operation based on simple cheating in the history of postwar Germany. State prosecutor Peter Lichtenberg estimates the amount of money these two firms alone have pumped out of 50,000 East Germans at DM 544 million.

Said Charlotte Arland, 75, pensioner, resident of the commune of Klein-Köris near Berlin: "When I opened the door, I saw a nice young man on the threshold. He told me that if I gave his firm DM 100, he would return DM 124 by Christmas. I gave him everything I had managed to save — DM 15,000. I hoped to get DM 18,600 back in a month's time, but the young man never came back with my money."

Many obscure firms are showering East Germans with a flow of newspaper

and magazine ads, booklets, posters pasted on the walls... Like swindlers who go door to door, they promise fantastic jobs, unprecedented interest rates and qualified advice on insurance matters...

Besides economic crimes, the number of other crimes, such as bank and museum robberies, hostage-taking, kidnapping, and thefts of cars, is increasing in East Germany. 400,000 crimes were registered in Berlin alone last year: one crime for every nine people. This year the crime statistics are even more terrifying. The situation worsened after the local criminal world was joined by professionals from the Soviet Union and Poland. The Poles mostly specialize in stealing cars.

Shady dealers in Poland accept orders for cars of any make, and organized groups of criminals steal the desired makes in German cities, primarily in Berlin which is a two-hour drive from the Polish border. The number of stolen cars is expected to reach 85,000 this year, with the total damage estimated at DM 800 million.

Recently, the Interior Ministers of Germany and Poland signed an agreement on cooperation in combating organized crime, but no tangible effect can be expected soon. The actual victims of car thefts — German insurance companies which have to pay the owners the full price of stolen cars — are most impatient.

As for Soviet mafiosi, rumours about them started circulating several years ago. There were stories about Russians from the

Siberian city of Chita taking part in a shootout in a pizzeria on Fasanenplatz. Then came more accurate information — actually, the shootout took place between Soviet mafiosi and Soviet emigrants in the Italian restaurant Da Gianni in downtown Berlin. Yegor Belashev opened fire from his pistol and was fired at in response. The shootout left five people wounded. The "cowboy" himself and two wounded victims are familiar faces for the Moscow criminal police. They are members of the notorious Chechen Mafia which has been operating in Berlin for several months already, extorting money from Soviet emigrants.

At the beginning of this year, two members of this group demanded DM 100,000 from one emigrant at gunpoint. In July, two corpses were fished out of a lake near the town of Königs-Wusterhausen to the south of Berlin, which the police later identified as those of Soviet gangsters. Soviet mafiosi are vying for spheres of influence. Police experts say that Soviet gangsters known for inventiveness and ruthlessness have long been operating in Poland in cooperation with the Polish Mafia. After the Polish-German border was opened, a massive influx of "red gangsters" into the West, primarily Germany, began. They are especially active among emigrants from the Soviet Union who probably cooperate with them in illegal operations. The problem has grown so acute that a group of twelve policemen had to be set up to combat the Soviet Mafia in Germany. Former Soviet citizens are being constantly warned that they live in Germany and must abide by German laws.

In this light it does not sound surprising that 92 percent of residents of East Berlin and 80 percent of residents of West Berlin feel that the criminal world constitutes an

immediate danger to their lives. At a news conference chairman of the CDU faction in the Berlin parliament Klaus Landowsky called on the city authorities to forget about "the grandiose plans for big-time politics" connected with Berlin as the possible host of the 2000 Olympics and with the upcoming merger of Berlin and the land of Brandenburg, and to start solving everyday problems, in particular, the problem of Berlin residents' safety.

Boris Lysenko,
our own correspondent



Restaurant Damiani in Berlin, where "red gangsters" settle things with each other

Photo from Der Spiegel (Germany)

BERLIN

Red Devils

For more than forty years the leaders of North Korea have been preoccupied with the business of inventing and methodically destroying enemies

Leonid Mlechin

We stayed at one and the same hotel in Seoul, although five years apart. I came to Seoul in 1989 while Kim Sun Il arrived there in 1984. The attitude towards us in Seoul was different. Even the South Korean government's desire to come to an understanding with Moscow, whatever the cost, did not make me any less suspicious to security people at the Kimpo airport. For not a second was I left alone, and the guards went through my luggage with a fine toothcomb. I was allowed to go out only after a colleague from Choson Ilbo came down to collect me. The security people carefully wrote down the colleague's name and position in the newspaper. The Republic of Korea is afraid of terrorists. Wherever I went in Seoul, I always met compact groups of similarly-clad young men with stony faces. The only other place where I saw as many secret police was in Pyongyang, North Korea.

Kim Sun Il did not attract the attention of the airport security or officials from the National Security Agency, formerly called by a more revealing name: The South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (Korean CIA). Actually, Kim Sun Il arrived in Seoul under a false name carrying a Japanese passport. As a result, he was treated as a friendly alien. He spent a week in Seoul and the South Korean secret service did not suspect him of using a false passport. Nor did it guess that the "Japanese" man was in fact their compatriot from the North. This mistake, which was revealed three years later in November 1987, resulted in the violent death of 115 people.

The Hotel President where Kim Sun Il and I stayed is situated in the centre of Seoul. I tried to understand what the purpose of Kim Sun Il's visit might have been. An on-site surveillance in the enemy's rear? A routine intelligence mission — meeting with undercover agents? Or preparation for the attack carried out in November 1987 and conceived in 1984, three months before Kim Sun Il landed in Seoul?

In 1953 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea concluded an armistice. However, the armistice was only for armics. Instead, secret services continued the war. The North Korean agent, Kim Sun Il, an electronics expert, played a key role in one of that war's most bloody episodes.

Father and daughter

They must have met in a secret training camp. Everything is secret in North Korea, but the facilities belonging to the state security constitute the supreme secret of the Party and the state. She was forty three years younger, beautiful, and came from a good Party family, but she was a new person in the



In October 1983 bombs planted by North Korean agents killed 17 South Koreans

business. He had seven children and a lot of experience.

Kim Sun Il could have carried out his mission alone, of course, but the stakes were so high that the girl, Kim Hyong Hi, was attached to him as an assistant. It was her first important assignment which would give her field experience. Besides, the North Korean intelligence does not usually send even the most loyal agents abroad, where there are so many temptations, alone.

Kim Sun Il and Kim Hyong Hi had a good story: during the trip they were to pose as Japanese citizens, father and daughter. He carried a Japanese passport issued in the name of Shinichi Hachiya. The passport was genuine, which made it especially valuable. The actual Shinichi Hachiya was careless enough to lend his passport and his personal seal — unlike everyone else, the Japanese stamp documents with personal seals, not sign them — to one Japanese businessman, Akira Miyamoto.

Akira Miyamoto was the name used by the North Korean resident who settled in Japan in 1948. In 1985, after another North Korean agent was discovered, the Japanese police started looking for Miyamoto, but he vanished into thin air. As for the passportless Shinichi Hachiya, he did not even bother to call the local police office. Thus one more opportunity to save the 115 victims, whose life would end two years later, was regrettably lost.

There was no authentic Japanese passport for Kim Hyong Hi and a false one was produced for her in Pyongyang. The Technical Department of the North Korean Intelligence must have done its job really well, for Kim Hyong Hi easily passed a number of border and immigration checkpoints with her forged passport arousing no suspicion. The passport was issued in the name of Mayumi Hachiya, daughter of Shinichi Hachiya.

Like most Koreans of advanced age, Kim Sun Il was fluent in Japanese — Japanese was taught as the native language in the Japan-colonized Korea until 1945.

A young woman, Kim Hyong Hi had to learn Japanese from scratch. She had a lot of teachers and instructors. One of them was a Korean woman, former resident of Japan, who had found herself in North Korea against her will.

Japan has a Korean population of about 700,000 — mostly descendants of Koreans whom the Japanese authorities brought to Japan for hard labour. But even for those of them who speak Japanese as their native tongue and bear Japanese names, Japan remains an alien country. The Japan-based Koreans feel themselves to be a minority and victims of discrimination. Quite a few Koreans living in Japan support the DPRK, seeing it as a Korean state where Koreans

can feel themselves masters of their own land. Some Koreans are also forced to cooperate with Pyongyang.

According to the Japanese police, several Koreans who had shown no intention of abandoning their families and stable life in Japan disappeared in 1977–1978. When interrogated by the police in September 1977, one Japanese Korean confessed that acting on orders from Pyongyang, he had lured a friend of his to the shore where that friend was seized and taken to North Korea on a power boat.

Several years later, when Kim Hyong Hi started giving evidence, it became clear why Japanese Koreans were kidnapped and shipped to North Korea: the North Korean Intelligence needed instructors with authentic command of Japanese and knowledge of Japanese realities. In the spring of 1991 the police showed Kim Hyong Hi the photos of sixteen different women. Kim Hyong Hi immediately singled out the photo of her former instructor from the secret training camp. I was in Japan at that time, and Japanese colleagues showed me the bar where the kidnapped woman had worked. One day in July 1978 the woman, then 36, went to work having left two children waiting for her at home and disappeared. According to Kim Hyong Hi, the instructor often wept and complained that she wanted to get back to her children.

Kim Hyong Hi and Kim Sun Il were in training for the mission for several years. In the fall of 1987 Pyongyang issued the go-ahead.

A radio set and a bottle of whisky

On November 12 Kim Sun Il and Kim Hyong Hi left Pyongyang for Moscow. There was a long road ahead of them. First of all, they had to get to the West from North Korea, a country securely isolated from the rest of the world. The Pyongyang — East Berlin flight was singled out as the most convenient one. In Moscow father and daughter spent several hours in the North Korean Embassy. They left Moscow for Budapest shortly thereafter, selecting the Hungarian capital as the most suitable place for becoming assimilated to an absolutely new environment. On November 18 they crossed the Austrian border by car. When they got into the car they were citizens of the DPRK, but when they got out they were already subjects of the Japanese Emperor.



In November 1987 Kim Sun Il and Kim Hyong Hi blew up a South Korean plane. 115 passengers died

The rest of the route they travelled as father and daughter Hachiya.

Absolutely indistinguishable from crowds of Japanese tourists, they bought a Mideast tour in Vienna. They were to visit Belgrade, Abu Dhabi, Baghdad, Amman... They were going to get on Korean Air's Flight 858 to fly from Baghdad to the capital of the United Arab Emirates.


On November 23 they flew to Yugoslavia to make the last preparations for the mission. Kim Hyong Hi later said they stayed at Belgrade's Metropolitan Hotel where they met North Korean agents from the Belgrade network who supplied father and daughter with a radio set and a bottle of whisky, both custom-made for the mission. Five days later they left for Baghdad to board the South Korean Boeing bound for Abu Dhabi.

In keeping with air safety regulations, batteries were taken out of Kim Sun Il's radio set in Baghdad. Right before the boarding the radio set once again attracted the attention of a security guard. Strangely, the batteries were back in place. Kim Sun Il turned on the radio demonstrating that there was nothing sinister about the thing. The guard let the elderly Japanese man board the plane.

Two hours later father and daughter got out of the plane in Abu Dhabi. The Boeing proceeded with its flight. Kim Sun Il and Kim Hyong Hi were to get out of the airport and to leave the United Arab Emirates on the very same day. However, it was in Abu Dhabi that their luck failed them.

Careful as they were, the operation's planners made one simple error. Father and daughter could not go out into the city because they had no UAE entry visas. They had to fly on to Bahrain. They arrived in Bahrain at the exact moment when Korea Air Flight 858 carrying 115 passengers was blown to pieces somewhere over Burma or Thailand.

350 grammes of C-4 plastic explosive, which is hard to detect by conventional detectors, and the whisky bottle filled with



Terrorist Kim Hyong Hi said she had been under orders personally signed by the Beloved Administrator Kim Jong Il, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, and Kim Il Sung's son

liquid explosive were enough to destroy the big plane. When he set the time fuse, Kim Sun Il gave himself and his partner nine hours to get away. However, when the bomb went off nine hours later, they were still in Bahrain.

Smoking is a health hazard

Interpol and the police of the countries where the blown-up Boeing landed immediately started looking through the passenger lists. People who got off the plane earlier than they were supposed to were naturally the first ones to arouse suspicion.

"The Japanese tourists" were found in the Bahrain Air Terminal. The experienced Kim Sun Il did not need much time to realize that the game was over. He asked his "daughter" to give him a cigarette. She took a pack of Marlboros from her purse. The police did not yet understand who it was they had arrested and never bothered to search the "tourists."

Kim Sun Il took out a cigarette and put it in his mouth. But instead of lighting it, he swallowed a potassium cyanide capsule hidden in the filter, and crashed to the floor dead. Kim Hyong Hi took out a pack of Marlboros, too, but she was not allowed to follow her senior partner — the police finally understood what was to be done. Probably, Kim Hyong Hi was not very eager to kill herself. Judging by how she behaved later, the North Korean Intelligence commanders had made a mistake when they selected her.

Kim Hyong Hi's passport immediately made the police suspicious, that is why the girl was sent to South Korea, not Japan. She started to talk on the ninth day after the arrest and a fortnight later the weeping terrorist appeared at a special news conference to tell the press that the plane had been

blown up in order to destabilize the situation in South Korea and force the international community to refuse to participate in the Seoul Olympics.

Kim Hyong Hi said she had been under orders personally signed by Kim Jong Il, the son and heir of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung who has ruled the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for more than forty years already.

At that time, South Korean journalists assured me that Kim Hyong Hi's confession was not the result of South Korean investigators' subtle technique. The young woman preferred to enjoy the good life which

the National Security officers repeatedly showed her from the car circling in downtown Seoul, to spending years in prison.

Both sides acted fairly and carried out their commitments. Kim Hyong Hi was pardoned. She is not the only North Korean agent to have been pardoned by the South Korean authorities. Those agents who confess their guilt before South Korea are treated with compassion, as victims of communist brainwashing. In 1968 a team of North Korean saboteurs made a suicidal attempt to take over the Blue House, the residence of the South Korean president. They killed 34 people and were killed themselves — all but one man who later repented, was pardoned, and subsequently became a well-to-do businessman and a good Christian.

The blowing up of the Korea Air Boeing was the biggest and bloodiest terrorist attack after the bomb attack in Rangoon made four years before Kim Sun Il's mission.

When a mistake means death

The autumn of 1983 was full of tragic events for South Korea. In September a Soviet AA fighter downed a Korea Air jumbo jet. A month later flags went down as a sign of mourning once again. Nightclubs, bars, cinema halls were closed for three days. State officials came to work wearing black ties.

Over one million people assembled for the funeral ceremony in Seoul. 17 urns, each topped with a photo of the victim, were placed on an altar decorated with thousands of yellow and white chrysanthemums. Four out of the seventeen victims were members of the South Korean government. They were killed in Rangoon, Burma, which the South Korean

delegation visited as part of a big regional tour.

The South Korean visitors were invited to the city's central square to attend a solemn ceremony. Only the head of the delegation, President Chun Doo Hwan, was missing: the Burmese Foreign Minister had come for him too late. This saved Chun's life.

Bombs operated by remote control were planted under the platform reserved for the South Korean delegation. The terrorist was to blow up the platform as soon as the President arrived. However, the president was nowhere to be seen. Finally, the terrorist saw a car with the South Korean flag pulling up to the platform. The car stopped and a man resembling the president emerged from it. An explosion roared. But the terrorist had made a mistake. He confused the South Korean Ambassador in Burma with the president. The bomb killed 17 Koreans, including the foreign minister who had been probing for contacts with the North Korean leadership, and four Burmese officials. 48 people were wounded.

The president interrupted the tour and returned to Seoul where he condemned North Korean leaders calling them the most inhumane creatures on earth. South Korea traditionally had a bad reputation, because the Seoul regime was internationally seen as a dictatorship. After the Rangoon attack, however, world leaders from Ronald Reagan to Indira Gandhi became much more sympathetic.

Several bombs did not work. South Korean experts who arrived to assist the Burmese police recognized the bombs: in July-August 1983 two terrorist groups from the North tried to infiltrate South Korea, but were killed in a skirmish with South Korean troops. The terrorists had carried the same explosive devices.

The Burmese police found one terrorist immediately after the attack: he had tried to kill himself by blowing up a grenade, but had survived. The next day two more Korean terrorists were found in a village outside Rangoon. They also tried to fight back by throwing grenades. One terrorist was killed (a North Korean-made radio transmitter was found on him), the other was arrested the next morning. He killed three policemen but was not allowed to escape.

The hunt for Chun Doo Hwan continued for several years. In 1982 Canadian police arrested several North Koreans on charges of having attempted to kill Chun Doo Hwan during his visit to Canada. In 1982-83 the South Korean security service arrested eight North Korean agents who attempted to penetrate the Blue House, remembering that during the 1974 storming their colleagues succeeded in killing the wife of the President...

Photos from magazines Newsweek (USA) and Korea (DPRK)

THIRD BASKET

INSIDE STORY

53 butchers and 2 witnesses

Lev Yelin

The decision to shoot 15,000 Polish officers to death was made in the spring of 1940 by the Politburo and signed by Stalin

I watched the video tape again and again. It was the recorded questioning of an old man whom I tried to interview, though without success. During a year, however, I learned about him perhaps no less than interrogators from the military procurator's office. Pyotr Soprunenko, a retired major general, was head of the NKVD department for POW affairs between 1939 and 1944. A young miner from the Donetsk coal basin, he was invited to work in the NKVD system, and to everyone's surprise quickly made a career there. In the mine, Soprunenko was an auxiliary worker (see no. 17/91). After several months of his service at the NKVD he was appointed assistant to the head of the NKVD secretariat and the following year he became chief of this department. Recently, the 83-year-old man underwent an operation on his stomach and now does not leave his flat on Sadovoye Koltso in Moscow.

Soprunenko keeps many secrets. The murder of 15,000 Polish POWs in the spring of 1940 may not be the most terrible of them. A three-hour recording is devoted to Poles only, for Soprunenko is evidently the main living eyewitness. The name of the chief of the department for POWs is mentioned several times in the documents found in the Soviet

archives and handed by Gorbachev over to Jaruzelski in April of last year.

In February 1940, Soprunenko suggested in a report to Beria that "the camps should be unloaded." (He had in mind the Starobelsk camp in the Kharkov region and the Kozelsk camp in the Smolensk region. Poles were also kept in the Ostashkov camp near Kalinin. — L.Y.)

It was hard for Soprunenko to sit still for a long time. Now and then he changed his position and threw his body back on the pillow. He was shown the evidence of a witness who categorically stated that Pyotr Soprunenko was involved in the mass killing of Poles. "All materials about the Poles went through the hands of Soprunenko," the witness asserted. "I heard Soprunenko deliver a report. He said that, according to his information, 14,000 ought to be shot to death." An hour passed, however, before Soprunenko began to "remember" the events. Many consider him a butcher, and he evidently felt terrible. He recalled the events with fear. The lean, emaciated old man jumped up, hanging over the table like a black shadow, and nervously rubbed his head. He avoided responding to direct questions until the end of the questioning. Soprunenko swore that he did not sign the documents tantamount to death sentences (the graphological examination would then completely refute his allegation). However, he finally revealed who had ordered the shooting of Polish officers.

"We shall need this place later"

It is easy to guess that investigation of the shooting



Pyotr Soprunenko questioned by Colonel of Justice Alexander Tretetsky



handed secret documents over to Jaruzelski. It was an admission of guilt. The Procurator's Office of the USSR was not in a hurry to comply with the President's will. Shortly after that the case was transferred to the Chief Military Procurator's Office. Since the men guilty of the Tbilisi and Vilnius bloodsheds went unpunished, this decision could be regarded as an attempt to rebury the Katyn story. Last spring, Alexander Katusev, the then chief military procurator, told me that the results of the Katyn investigation would become known in at least a year. At that moment I recalled words from a popular song, "but better never."

I was wrong. During that time a group of investigators from the Chief Military Procurator's Office, consisting of Colonel of Justice Tretetsky (head) and Lieut. Colonels Granenov, Yablokov and Shelomayev, continued to work honestly, paying no attention to the periods of "popularity" and "unpopularity" of the Katyn theme in the higher echelons of power. They burrowed into the archives, searched for and questioned witnesses, determined the places of burials and, together with Polish experts, exhumed the remains of victims for examination. The memory of the computer, almost the only one at the disposal of the military procurator's office, contained more exact data on all Poles imprisoned in the Ostashkov, Kozelsk and Starobelsk camps.

"Our work was not always popular," said 47-year-old Colonel of Justice Nikolai Anisimov, assistant to the Chief Military Procurator and head of the department for supervision of the fulfilment of laws during preliminary investigation by KGB bodies and for rehabilitation affairs. Though many officers in KGB regional departments considered it a matter of honour to help the investigation, Anisimov added, the procurators would hear statements like this: "The presidential decree is not for us. There was no order from Kryuchkov (KGB chairman)."

On August 19, the first day of the coup, the chief of the KGB department for the Tver Region told the Tretetsky-led group,



Major General
Pyotr Soprunenko, 1960

In No. 17/91, I cited facts, incongruous at first sight, from the "official" dossier of Pyotr Soprunenko. In September 1950, he was severely reprimanded for "a serious emergency in the Urals" by the party commission of the GULAG, though at that time he was serving in the military construction units of the NKVD. I expressed the opinion that Soprunenko might have supervised the construction of an "atomic town" near Chelyabinsk and that GULAG prisoners worked on his building sites. Recently, I got a copy of the newspaper *Uralsky Shakhtyor* (Ural Miner) published in the town of Gubakhy. In the opinion of journalist V. Dzyublyuk, Soprunenko received a party reprimand after a riot of inmates of camp No. 1 near the top-secret atomic town of Chelyabinsk-40.

In the postwar years, Chelyabinsk-40 produced its first uranium concentrate brought up to nuclear fuel. The camp inmates were employed in the most harmful processes. The riot, which lasted several days, Dzyublyuk writes, was drowned in blood by machinegun fire. "On another occasion," the journalist notes, "Lavrenty Beria, the master and guard of the country's defence installations, personally shot to death the chief of the camp, and ordered that the corpse remain lying for three days." Soprunenko could also fall victim to Beria's hot temper.

who exhumed the remains of murdered Poles: "In the new situation your work has lost its meaning. You must stop the excavations and, in general, we shall need this place later."

The procurators did not stop the excavations, though an official of the KGB department for the Tver Region politely explained that in this case no one would guarantee their personal safety.


Anisimov, who went to the place of the conflict right away, acidly commented later: "Look, what continuity. At that time the local NKVD buried murdered Poles closer to its country houses to make the operation secure. Today more country houses have been built for KGB workers — right on the bones of murdered Poles."

"I've read it and felt ill"

After April 1990, no one except *Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal* (The Journal of Military History) doubted that the Poles had been shot by the NKVD, not Germans, as Stalin propaganda had claimed in 1944. It remained unknown, however, who issued the order. Soprunenko's daughter, with whom I talked many times, though without success, asking her to arrange an interview with her father, once conveyed to me his words: "Stalin personally ordered the killing of Polish officers. Dad saw the order bearing Stalin's signature."

I was almost sure that Stalin, if he really had issued the order, or Beria, did not leave written instructions, and everything was reduced, as it often happened in the past, to a note on a document containing "suggestions" of some faithful servant, like Soprunenko. The note would say, "Please confer with me," and would be followed by an oral instruction which had to be fulfilled unreservedly none the less.

Having tired out the investigators completely, Soprunenko finally began to talk. He recalled a meeting held by Beria's deputy Kobulov in the NKVD offices. Eight to twelve persons were present.



"We were asked in turn to read some letter," Soprunenko said. "It was a Politburo decision signed by Stalin. I remember the word 'shoot.' On reading the letter I felt ill."

I saw on the video tape that at this moment Soprunenko jumped up to show how he, holding on to a chair, then had hardly kept his feet. I do not believe him. I have already seen the video tape recording of the questioning of Dmitry Tokarev, another participant in that meeting. It turned out that he also felt terrible emotions. "I asked Kobulov's permission to stay and told him: 'I have never taken part in such operations, especially on such a wide scale, and I'm afraid that I won't be able to do anything.'" According to Tokarev, Kobulov got very angry. It's a pity, however, that no one can confirm or deny this fact, because it was a tête-à-tête conversation. I suspect that we would have heard many other variants if all participants in the meeting were alive.

Why did Stalin actually pass a death sentence on the Polish officers? Soprunenko believes that the "great leader" could not forgive the Red Army's defeat near Warsaw in 1920. Stalin was then a member of the military council.

Soprunenko alleged that after the meeting held by Kobulov he went to Vyborg to discuss the exchange of POWs with Finns. On returning from Vyborg, he learned from his deputy Khokhlov that "the camps had been unloaded." The investigators managed to prove, however, that Soprunenko visited Moscow during his business mission from April 14 to June 7, that during this time the NKVD chiefs did not absolve him of responsibility for the shooting of the Polish officers. "Soprunenko demanded," Lieut. Colonel Yablokov said, "that the chiefs of NKVD regional departments and camps sent reports to him. He controlled the execution of the order and constantly informed his superiors of all the stages." Soprunenko signed reports on the movement of prison railway cars, on the lists of Poles brought into NKVD prisons to be shot. "Why did the NKVD transfer Poles into internal prisons?" an investigator asked. "This was done to decide whether someone could be acquitted or perhaps convicted," Soprunenko alleged. "Do you remember that anyone was acquitted?" Soprunenko was asked. He could not recall any case.

On April 4, Soprunenko sent a written instruction to the chiefs of camps. He advised them "to keep their agents from among the Poles instead of sending them to prisons," that is, save them from execution. In the same month Soprunenko demanded that "strict secrecy should be observed during the transfer of Poles to NKVD prisons." Usually there was no secrecy in such cases.

"It is not my handwriting," Soprunenko said when he was shown his resolution on a camp chief's report "People have been dispatched." Soprunenko alleged that his de-

puty Khokhlov signed the report instead of him. The investigator then produced Khokhlov's report with Soprunenko's resolution. "Does it mean that Khokhlov sent reports to himself?" he asked.

Incidentally, the investigators also have instructions drawn up by Soprunenko long

"I can only regret," Soprunenko said at the end of the questioning. "It was not I who made the decision, and it was not I who put it into effect."

"Let's go and begin"


I can believe that Soprunenko did not shoot Poles himself. However, I have less faith in 89-year-old Dmitry Tokarev, another eyewitness and former head of the NKVD department for the Kalinin Region, where the largest camp for Poles, at Ostashkov, was situated.

Tokarev distinctly remembers the meeting held by Kobulov. According to him, Soprunenko delivered a report at that meeting and revealed how many Poles were to be shot.

"In March of 1940 — I remember exactly, because I was given then the rank of

major of state security — I, my deputy Pavlov, and Rubanov, a commandant of our department, were ordered to come to Moscow. Pavlov and I joked in the car: 'We're going to the capital with our own commandant.' The NKVD commandants usually carried out sentences. In Moscow, we went straight to Kobulov. I saw 15 to 20 people in his office. Among them were heads of the NKVD departments for the Smolensk and Kharkov regions. Kobulov informed us of the decision of higher authorities to shoot representatives of the punitive bodies of the Polish Republic captured when Soviet troops entered the territory of the eastern regions of Poland."

After that Tokarev, as he now remembers distinctly, had a tête-à-tête with Beria's



Dmitry Tokarev: "I did not take part in the shooting for moral reasons"

before his business trip to Vyborg. In November 1939, he issued an instruction to bring the cases of 6,005 Poles to a special conference ("The order was given by Beria personally," he claimed). In his report to Beria on February 20, 1940, Soprunenko proposed "unloading the camps" and transferring 400 to 500 cases for consideration by a special conference. The proposal returned three days later in the form of Beria's instruction which Soprunenko conveyed to the heads of regional NKVD departments. Under this instruction practically all Polish officers from the Starobelsk and Kozelsk camps had to be moved into internal prisons for the examination of their cases by a special conference. This can be regarded as the beginning of the death conveyor.



The remains of executed Poles exhumed in the vicinity of the Mednoye village

deputy in order to state his position to him. During the interrogation, Tokarev stressed that "he did not take part in the operation for moral reasons." And already then told his deputy that the decision of higher authorities was unjust and ran counter to the Geneva agreements.

Such a principled stand, it appears, was adopted by Dmitry Tokarev, head of the NKVD department in the Kalinin Region. It will be recalled, however, that apart from Poles, 6,000 "enemies of the people" were kept in 1940 in the 14 prisons of that region.

Denying his part in the shootings, Tokarev nevertheless drew a detailed picture of the execution of 6,000 Poles in his region.

"Shortly after that meeting," he went on, "state security major Sinegubov, NKVD commandant Blokhin and brigadier commander Krivenko, chief of the NKVD directorate of escort troops, arrived in Kalinin from Moscow. They stayed in a saloon car at the dead-end siding of the station. Blokhin was obviously the main person, because all messages from Moscow were addressed to him."

Poles were transferred from the Ostashkov camp to the NKVD building on Sovetskaya Street. Its basement had been turned into a prison. According to Tokarev's testimony, the method of shooting had been worked out by Blokhin and local commandant Rubanov. The door and walls of one of the cells had been covered with thick cloth so that the shots would not be heard outside. The prison was temporarily cleared of other inmates.

"One by one, Poles were led from their cells to the recreation and reading room (generally called Lenin room), where their surnames, first names and year of birth were checked," Tokarev said. "I dropped into that room several times and tried to leave it as quick as possible. Once I asked a young Pole how old he was. He was 18, quite a young boy. (The video tape showed that at this moment Tokarev smiled kindly, as it happens when elderly people talk about children; true, it does not usually happen before children are shot.)

"A Pole was then handcuffed and led to a special cell where he was shot in the back of the head, and that was the end," Tokarev concluded.

He was surprised when the investigator asked whether the decision of the special conference was read out to Poles, or whether the procurator was present.

"No," he replied. "Kobulov said there must be no living eyewitnesses (those not involved in the shooting — L.Y.). I even persuaded one driver, a good fellow, to take part in the shooting, because otherwise he could be eliminated as an eyewitness himself."

It is not clear, however, how Tokarev himself remained "clean if that were really true."

Ten people — commandants, some warders and drivers — took direct part in the shootings. "My driver Sukharev was very active," Tokarev said. "One evening he told me, 'I worked hard today.'"

They did so not only out of fear and because there was an appropriate order. Some hoped for a reward. It was a usual thing after executions. Indeed, later on a list of those who "distinguished themselves" was compiled, and everyone was given a monthly salary. The investigators found the list — 53 people were di-

rectly involved in the shooting of Poles in the Katyn forest, Kalinin and Kharkov. All of them died. Tokarev was not in the list. He claims that his name was struck out by rancorous Kobulov.

As in Katyn, the Poles were shot with German-made Walter pistols. Later on this fact was given as indisputable proof of the guilt of the Germans.

"The point is that because of constant shooting, our TT pistols failed," Tokarev explained. "Blokhin had brought a whole suitcase of Walters. He issued them and then took the pistols away and locked them in the case."

Small wonder that TT pistols failed. During a month, working almost every night, they killed 6,000 people.

"A group of 300 Poles was brought from the Ostashkov camp on the first occasion," Tokarev reminisced. "The group proved too large for us, because we finished shooting at sunrise. Nights became shorter and we had to finish the work during the night. So, groups of 200 to 250 Poles were delivered later."

Though Stalin's decision was to be strictly fulfilled, a man could avoid being shot if he was a relative of some well-known person. Once Tokarev had a telephone call from Moscow. A young Pole, a nephew of well-known film director Mikhail Romm, must not be executed. Tokarev barely managed to fulfil this instruction.

Tokarev swore that he was not present at the shooting. However, he remembers well the first night.

"Blokhin, Sinegubov and Krivenko came to my office. 'Let's go and begin,' they said. Before the shooting Blokhin put on special clothes: a brown leather cap, a long leather apron of the same colour, and brown leather gloves which reached up to his elbows. I saw a butcher," Tokarev said.

The dead bodies were taken out of the cell through the back door and thrown into covered lorries. Then five or six lorries drove to the burial place close to the Mednoye village.

"It was beside NKVD country houses and one of my two country houses. It was Blokhin who chose the place. He also brought two excavating machine operators from Moscow."

When the Poles had been finished off, a banquet was given in the railway saloon car. True, the butchers drank vodka every day, after the shootings. Tokarev said that Blokhin bought whole boxes of vodka.

Tokarev, a blind old man who barely finds his way in his own flat, shook his head:

"They all had a bad end. Commandant Rubanov went mad and shot himself. Blokhin became an inveterate drunkard and also shot himself. My deputy Pavlov also shot himself, though he did not kill other people. Sukharev, my driver, shot himself with the same Walter pistol with which he shot Poles."

Questions to a man now under investigation

No sooner had the last shots been fired than the circumstances of the murder of the Poles became a state secret. Guards were stationed at the burial place not far from the Mednoye village and a doorkeeper was appointed, allegedly to protect Tokarev's country house.

At the end of the war, Tokarev passed on the secret to his successor Senenkov, who later became first deputy head of a department at the Party Central Committee's headquarters.

Each new head of a department of the NKVD and later, the KGB, not only in Kalinin, but also in Smolensk and Kharkov, learned about the circumstances of the tragedy which occurred in the spring of 1940. And they did everything to keep the secret. A former KGB official, who worked in one of the departments mentioned, told me that even special secret cases were kept thorough record of.

In Moscow, the secret was kept by the sixth sector of the CPSU Central Committee archives, where the Politburo documents are gathered and where, among others, the decision made in March 1940 must be kept. Before Gorbachev presented the Poles with the documents proving the NKVD's guilt, there could be no talk of encroaching on the CPSU Central Committee archives in order to throw light on the "Polish problem."

In December 1990 and then in March 1991, the military procurator's office applied to Valery Boldin, head of the general affairs department at the party's Central Committee, asking him to help find the Politburo's decision made in the spring of 1940. There was no reply, and it is now clear why. Boldin, one of the key figures in the August coup which was to restore the party's waning power, did not want to give the "slanderers" of the party such a trump card as the Politburo's decision on the shooting of 15,000 citizens of a neighbouring state.

Besides, Boldin then became head of the USSR presidential office. Shortly before his appointment he took a step which seemed strange at the time. Many documents, those from the sixth sector in particular, were transferred to the presidential archives. It became clear later that he placed them under his control. In the opinion of Anatoly Prokopenko, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation's committee for archives, Boldin could mix up the documents, thereby concealing other improper decisions of higher party bodies.

The procurators are now awaiting a reply to their address to Gorbachev. They also sent a request to the new KGB chief. Incidentally, even if the document concerned has been eliminated, the testimony of eyewitnesses is quite enough from the legal point of view.

Is it the end of the story? I doubt that a trial will be held and that two miserable, though terrible old men without remorse will be put in the dock. Strictly speaking, for what crime should they be tried? Crimes against humanity, as it was formulated at the Nuremberg trial? This usually refers to the Nazis. What about the Soviets? The two men carried out the decisions made by higher authorities. So several more articles will probably be written, a documentary film made, and that is all.

It hardly is enough for the crime, as a result of which even butchers went mad and shot themselves. On the other hand, I cannot imagine what could be enough.

Sex life in the fourth dimension

Anatoly Rubinov

**What Lenin
warned
Klara Zetkin
about
has materialized**

In the second half of the year 1990, our hotel receptionists suddenly came to life like mechanical dolls set into motion in the display window of a provincial toy store. They raised their eyelids and started rolling their eyes towards those who addressed them, but so far neither has learned to answer the guests' questions, nor dropped the habit of having tea-and-cake parties regardless of how many guests wanted their attention. The queues in front of the receptionists' desks shortened and calmed down — the more getting individuals had already found out about private hotels being opened. Well, not exactly hotels, but very expensive overnight hostels the addresses of which were available at railway stations. No one could imagine how the little innovation, salutary for transit visitors, would liven up Muscovites' sex life.

The sexual revolution was in its fourth year then. Many middle-aged family men suddenly realized, to their dismay, how much they had missed. At that time, literature never seen in this country in Soviet years was already offered by hawkers openly or on the sly, and sold like hot cakes. At first there appeared large photographic prints of diagrams looking like sets of road signs. On inspection they turned

out to be schematic illustrations of sex positions. Although conventional and laconic, the symbols excited the public. It suddenly dawned upon many men, with decades of sedentary family life behind them, that there was still a lot to discover. Those who could not bring themselves to buy the prints put their glasses on (most of them were already old enough to have developed far-sightedness), leaned over the counters and inspected the diagrams thoroughly in an attempt to grasp the particulars. Some were too shy to show interest and therefore went from stall to stall, studying horizontal positions here and vertical there, and learning, to their amazement, that there is a third geometrical dimension, and even a fourth one... Young people would definitely unfold the thing in a metro train, scandalizing the women seated next to them and ready to counter protests with "We've got freedom of the press now, and I've bought this from a newsstand!" The curious women, who would always peep, from under their eyelashes, at what their neighbour was reading, blushed; most seethed with silent indignation and became disappointed in *perestroika*.

Diagrams of intimate positions appeared on the market before other such publications did for the simple reason that photographs take much less time to make than books do. It can be copied from a book in any language, Japanese even. As to the book itself, you've got to translate it, to begin with.

A thorough study was given to sex literature in all languages. Our young cooperative publishing companies were in a hurry. They knew that the iron had to be struck while it was hot. The primitive photographic sheet, poor-quality and brittle, cost five rubles. Five rubles a sheet! Five thousand rubles for a thousand photographic prints! Just one day's earnings could buy a car. The first "manuals for men" sold as quickly as cheap ice cream bars did later, after sugar rationing was introduced. The supply kept growing. Books for women appeared. Then books for men over 21 and for girls under 18. Then a sex encyclopaedia for children under 12. The cooperative publisher's price on the cover was three rubles, but the hawkers charged a tenner a copy, and did a roaring trade!

Twenty years earlier, word had come from abroad that intimate relations were discussed openly there. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* carried an article by Ada Baskina, entitled *Neither a Beast nor an Angel*, which the public found most piquant. The author argued for sexual education. The word "sexual" came as a bad shock to the editor-in-chief. He inter-


Continued from No.41/91



Drawing by Leonid Tishkov

cepted the article virtually minutes before the matrices went into the printing press, and, at the eleventh hour, linotypists changed words "sex" and "sexual" for euphemisms like "intimate physiology." However, one phrase, which later gained considerable currency and came under extensive discussion in intellectual circles remained. It went: "Let me be quite frank about it: a wife should be not only a wife, but a mistress as well!" Ada's husband was the first to be embarrassed, because his own connubial bed was in question: the readers took it that the author lived up to her principles. At that time *Literaturnaya Gazeta* was very popular with our intelligentsia, and whenever they got together for a festive occasion — a birthday or a national holiday — educated people always discussed their favourite paper which united them, dwelling especially on the article about the need for "enlightenment in intimate relations" and for the wife to be a mistress as well.

That article saw the light of day thanks to the sacred name of Lenin. Even its very title gives us a fragment of a Lenin quotation. Vladimir Ilyich had once told Klara Zetkin, then already well advanced in years, that a human being was neither a beast nor an angel, and that therefore sexual attraction was part of normal human behaviour. It was only thanks to that wise pronouncement that the article appeared in print. It left no one cold. Some approved of it and subscribed to the author's demand that books on the physiology of love be published in large editions; others reproached the author for vulgarity and preaching bourgeois morals. A public discussion ensued. It helped the *Meditsina* publishers to bring out the first book on a subject entirely new to our medical profession — contraception. Translated from the German, the book had been written by Professor Neubert of the GDR. The old scientist's work was thoroughly edited and filtered for use in the Soviet Union. After that, the *Druzhba* bookstore on Moscow's Gorky Street ventured to order from the GDR the *Sexological Dictionary*, also by Professor Neubert — that book about the anatomy and functioning of the human body was available exclusively to a narrow circle of experts by subscription only. Doctors and medical college instructors applied to the Moskniga book distributors in writing for copies of the *Sexological Dictionary*. The book was



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

printed in German, of course, but thanks to it the word "sexological" first appeared in Russian — at least in order forms, which poured into the Moskniga director who made a point of filling only 50 percent of the orders. The reason lay not only in the insufficient supply of copies. Shortly before, the director had gotten into trouble: he had put up for sale a small book in Hungarian about the artist Marc Chagall with ten or so reproductions in it. The city Party Committee could not tolerate what it described as propaganda of decadent bourgeois art, and so the bookstore director, in order to stave off accusations of publicizing the ideology of imperialism, asked every applicant for the sex book: "Are all the comrades on this list able to read German?" Some were not, of course, which gave the director reason to slash the number of copies ordered in half. The lucky ones entered the *Druzhba* store with eager anticipation, handed the sales clerk an official application for the Dictionary, "okayed" by the Moskniga director. As the clerk passed them a package, he asked them, under his breath, not to unwrap it then and there lest the other shoppers should go on a rampage. Upon getting hold of "secret literature," its owners felt as if they had been initiated into a great mystery.

The article *Neither a Beast, nor an Angel* engendered a lot of folklore. Many people of mature age started sharing their experience with the paper's editors. They volunteered to solve anyone's intimate problems! One reader informed the editors he had made a discovery that women, those cunning creatures, were to blame for men's impotence. In order to frustrate their husbands and then put them to shame, the wives got them in bed, but instead of joining them as expected, they would rush out of the bedroom to attend to a household chore as if the latter brooked no delay. They started washing dishes, sweeping the floors or dusting the furniture, while the husbands waited, calling for them in vain, eating their hearts out... The author of the discovery wrote that after he had seen through his wife, he began to pay her in kind, washing dishes, sweeping the floor, even mending something while the wife waited, called and tossed around... Finally he joined her at the last moment, when she wanted him most...

The editors received an avalanche of frank letters, from men mostly. They decided to write about their problems to the paper rather than to see a doctor, because they didn't know what kind of doctor to see and, besides, were too shy to confess certain things to someone in person. There were a few letters from young men who had failed to consummate their marriage on the wedding night and who threatened to commit suicide... By that time, however, there appeared Moscow's first clinic specializing in "intimate problems." Its director, Dr G. Vasilchenko, had been to all civilized countries, worked in the World Health Organization for years, knew about twenty languages and returned to Moscow eager to write a book and to organize a sexological service. He went through all the difficulties which had to befall someone courageous enough to make up a bourgeois science. Having written a book about the treatment of male impotence, he managed to have it published in spite of all the opposition. Even his learned colleagues reproached him for using the indecent word "impotence." That word, you see, could only be pronounced — but not written, let alone put on the cover of a book. That was the limit!

In the meantime a brave woman in the health resort of Mineralnye Vody proclaimed herself to be the town sexologist and started giving lectures to men who were taking treatment there. Stomach and liver

cases from all over the country ventured to attend the lecture knowing for certain that they would not run into their relatives and friends there. It was like going to a brothel. The lecturer did not spare her bashful audience's sensibilities. Always calling things by their proper names, the lady doctor explained to the men the causes of their temporary failures and how to rule them out. Amazingly, the men — who were no longer in the prime of life, as one seldom develops stomach or liver trouble in one's early years — learned from her what many discover by intuition. Delighted by their new knowledge, they started looking for a chance to use it before going back to their wives. According to eyewitnesses, Mineralnye Vody throbbed with excitement then: As the news spread, many wordly-wise women who had no stomach or liver complaints at all opted for a holiday in Mineralnye Vody.

Georgy Stepanovich Vasilchenko succeeded in setting up the country's first laboratory of sexology and sexopathology. It was not allowed to function on its own — only as part of the Moscow Institute of Psychiatry, probably on the assumption that those new, indecent, crazy words would be better confined to a madhouse. This scared normal people away, of course, no one wanted to be on a psychiatrist's books. Nevertheless, patients did turn up, because the laboratory remained their only hope. Men took the initiative this time, to be followed by women, and finally, by married couples.

At first, sexologists were surprised by their wretched patients being no wiser on the subject of sex than teenage school kids who haven't yet gotten around to the twenty or thirty pages of the anatomy and physiology textbook which their schoolteachers shyly leave to them to read on their own, and which are never discussed in class, because such discussions would inevitably involve mentioning the "unmentionable" parts of the human anatomy.

In the early stages, sexologists and sexopathologists effected ready cures for the complaints of the men who had no idea about what to do with their wives in the privacy of their bedrooms. Upon hearing out a doctor's advice those adults blushed, took heart, and hurriedly left for home determined to follow the learned



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

man's instructions. Most of them never came back. Others, on the contrary, returned proud and happy, and insisted on giving their saviour a drink of vodka right there in the snow-white office, amidst case histories.

After the advent of the sexual revolution epoch, the patients became more demanding. He has seen the diagrams, read a couple of books and, overcome by grief over all the opportunities he has missed, is ready to pay any money to make up for it — "for all those years lived out in vain," to quote a favourite Soviet author. However, medical service in the Soviet Union is free, i.e. involves no expenses, while treatment sometimes brings excellent results. Quite often, the wives of cured patients seek out the doctor to give him, in appreciation, a bottle of brandy or a crystal wineglass (it is considered bad taste to give men flowers). If you find yourself in an apartment full of crystal bowls, it is safe to presume that your host is a doctor. A celebrated psychiatrist I know — an expert in preventing suicides — had in his apartment 56 empty crystal vases, and one with withered flowers in it. This suggests that at least 57 have been saved, one of them quite recently.

Incidentally, this psychiatrist is of the

opinion that suicide statistics have changed over the years of *perestroika*: now much fewer people kill themselves because of their sex troubles. The porno hawkers who display their wares on empty fruit cartons must be given their due. Calendars with the close-up photographs of sex-appealing women sell especially well. Time went slower than did the emancipation of the calendars — the women on them struck ever more defiant and shameless attitudes, and their eyes challenged the male passers-by and stopped them. Even our women, beset with domestic problems, look back over their shoulders nervously, and as for men, many retrace their steps to take another look. Not necessarily to buy, just to look.

Moscow's sex life has its effect even on conscripts spending years in barracks without female company and looking forward to being demobilized. An inventive journalist, remote from medicine but concerned with the public weal, realized that his time had come. He decided to write a book, called *A Thousand Questions and a Thousand Answers about Sex*. He did not yet know the questions then, but had the answers at his fingertips. The questions came after the readers of a youth paper had been encouraged to ask them. Out of mischief, they asked enough questions to baffle even a sage. Nevertheless, the journalist coped with them. His answers to a few risky questions, published in the same paper, at first all but created a scandal. That happened at the very beginning of the sexual revolution, and the city Komsomol Committee became indignant and demanded an end to the "sex orgy in the press."

Two years later answers to frank questions began to appear in — believe it or not — a magazine published specially for private soldiers and corporals. For decades, it had taught the soldier to love his Motherland, to take good care of his weapons, called upon him to back the political instructors' propaganda effort. And now it started teaching the soldier how to handle a woman and reassuring him that the sinful games he played in his forced monastic seclusion would in no way show after demobbing, when he gets married, even if he prefers to sow his wild oats before doing so. The whole of the Soviet Army — officers as well as enlisted men — read that magazine, which has now reached the peak of its popularity. In their barracks, soldiers discussed questions and answers to loud guffaws

meant to disguise their interest in the problem. The magazine was passed round. It kept up the soldiers' spirits markedly. Petty officers noted that their men cheered up, that the feelings of depression and homesickness abated. Soldiers began to write home more often, and many recalled some long-forgotten addresses. Relieved of their qualms about "sinful play," they began to indulge in it with unprecedented enthusiasm, almost unashamedly, because the man who knew the answers to a thousand sex questions had promised them that everything would pass, that everything would be all right...

The porno movies, smuggled in from the West, have brought the smugglers enormous profit. Whereas some of our city streets go without a video room, no railway station does. This is true of all our cities, not only Moscow. Videos are shown from morning till night, at very short intervals, at each railway station or in close proximity to it. They help while away the time for those who cool their heels waiting for a train or lining up for train tickets (which are still hard to get). Some of those who get stuck at a railway station stay there long enough to view all the videos on the programme: since the travelling public is extremely fluid, the video room owners make with just a few cassettes. The worse for wear after endless playbacks, they produce faded, blurred pictures to a raucous sound track, and one can only wonder how the audience can make them out at all. In the meantime, railway station masters report to their superiors that they take extra pains to entertain the waiting passengers — but keep mum about the profits made by the cooperative video businesses they patronize.

A passenger thus entertained leaves the video room and, stretching himself, goes back to the stuffy, overcrowded waiting room; he is sexually aroused, and he starts thinking about things he wouldn't have even dreamt of doing at home, in the presence of his wife. He gets too sociable and playful. His eyesight improves all of a sudden, he spots a lady passenger, lonely and bored like himself, and even if he is normally shy, tries to make her acquaintance. He notices, of course, an advertisement saying that a cooperative hotel offers overnight accommodation. He puts the telephone number down on the margin of a newspaper page, calls the proprietor — and the op-

portunity which has unexpectedly presented itself takes his breath away. Amazed, he goes to that place where they already know his name and are waiting for him. He is not alone, of course, but in the company of the lady fellow traveller, whose surname he doesn't know and feels it improper to ask.

The landladies who, thanks to the enterprising cooperative, suddenly have a chance to make an extra ruble, welcome any guest who has made a "reservation" by telephone, but remain vigilant. A guest is supposed to hand in his passport to the landlady for the night. To avoid any misunderstandings, he is to pay for the room in advance, no matter how late it is. All these formalities completed, he is shown to a room empty of all furniture except for a bed with clean bedclothes spread over it. If two lodgers turn up instead of the one expected — well, it's good news for the proprietress of overnight "singles": in that case she may double the charge, and whether the man's companion is his wife or neighbour makes no difference. The guests are only too willing to pay up, they even make much fuss about it. Some of the older landladies, however, stick to the principles inculcated in them by Soviet newspapers and television. They open the guests' passports, leaf through them, inspect them closely, and upon finding a discrepancy, selflessly refuse admission. No, they won't put up with immorality and will never let anyone turn their apartment into a mating ground. Unafraid of night-time intruders, they all but kick them out and then phone the cooperative and, proud of their aloofness and adherence to moral principles, ask them to send more decent clients — although the cooperative welcomes any alien who pays.

The advent of an obliging — albeit invisible — private hostelry scattered all over Moscow has offered serious competition to the arrogant and "impregnable" state-run hotels, which charge less but offer more comfort. The quick-witted Muscovites immediately got wind of its existence (the state-run hotels refuse them accommodation on the grounds that they have a place to spend a night in). Even on New Year's eve, when everyone wants to stay at home and hotels are empty — so much so that even all the lights are out

— no one will offer accommodation to someone with a Moscow passport even if he swears on the Bible or on his Party membership card that he has quarrelled with his wife or that the floor in his apartment has collapsed. The fat tea-drinking and chocolate-eating receptionists won't even look his way. They do not believe anyone because they guard public morals and because family virtues come first to them. That is, they should to others, while they themselves are not particularly exacting as far as their own morals are concerned. There are two reasons for this: first, they are divorced, disillusioned with love, or have never experienced any. And besides, certain lady receptionists and chambermaids, who still have their looks, would rather sacrifice themselves to the travelling gentlemen, who have left their families behind, than give them up to strange women. Even they, however, will not accommodate a Muscovite who has quarrelled with his wife to the point of being ready to kill her. Nor will they accommodate a poor homeless man doomed to courting his loved one in a hotel room — although they have certainly seen foreign films about hotel-room love affairs. They feel sorry for movie characters, they even cry over their wretchedness, they sympathize with American Blacks, with refugees, with the homeless — they despise our own Tartars, Jews and Caucasians, although in the Caucasus, there are hundreds of different nationalities, each with a history going back millions of years, I mean the descendants of the Scythians, for instance.

The ubiquitous Moscow hotel has opened its doors to Muscovites as well, giving many enterprising men a lot of hope. Some of the hopes have come true. Quite a few men have the telephone number which they can always dial to find out if there is a vacant bed for them. The women on the other end of the line will not be taken aback by a man's desire to share a bed with someone in the afternoon, because this means a double charge for a single bed.

One may get the impression that all the problems have been solved and that no temptations, previously taboo, are out of reach any longer. Sexologists alone know how deceptive this view is.

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Introduced by
New Times analyst
Rostislav Zolotaryov

Nationalism and democracy, ethnic egotism and human rights are much discussed nowadays. These problems have arisen with the collapse of the socialist empire in Eastern Europe and the declarations of sovereignty and independence by the republics of the former Eurasian empire.

However, similar matters were considered earlier, too, especially where the process of democratization were belated and the development of national self-awareness ran, unfortunately, far ahead of the inculcation of devotion to universal

human values — as was the case in Eastern Europe.

Istvan Bibó, a Hungarian thinker, assumed the task of analyzing these processes. However, even before him these topics had been treated by Austrian Social Democrats Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, as well as Tomas G. Masaryk. In 1946, soon after World War II, I. Bibó wrote a large article entitled "The East European small nations' spiritual poverty." He was compelled to write it by the anticipation of the onslaught of a dreadful danger — nationalism. We offer you now fragments of this article.

A few words about the scholar's life. He was born in Budapest into a family which belonged to the Hun-

garian intellectual elite and received an excellent education: first theological and then juridical. Although as early as the 1930s he possessed two doctoral degrees — in law and in political science, he continued to study both in his own country and abroad.

During the war he was arrested by the fascist authorities for rescuing Jews. After the war he engaged in pedagogic and scholarly activities.

However, new repressions began — this time by the communist "people's democracy." The third tide of repressions caught him after the 1956 revolution was suppressed. Only the amnesty of 1963 released him from the dungeon. He resumed scholarly activities again, yet now as a repressed person, he

FROM THE

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CENTURY
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THOUGHT

couldn't occupy prominent academic positions. He passed away in 1979, but his books and diaries remained.

It will be possible to familiarize oneself with his heritage in the magazine *Hungarian Meridian*. (No 2/91).

Beyond ethnos

Istvan Bibó (1911–1979)

The nation as a characteristically European type of civil community is a product of nearly fifteen centuries of development. There exists the rather superficial idea that during the last millennium and a half the state borders in Europe and, together with them, the national boundaries have been incessantly changed and that neither stability nor internal coherence has been observed there, except in the effect of power structures as a constant factor in this process. This approach ignores the fact that the chaotic character of the incessant variability of state borders and the extremely complicated vassalage structure conceal the astonishing and rare stability of national boundaries in Europe, which does not apply only to some critical periods of national formation... As evidenced by history, the weakening of a central power and the achievement of independence by local bodies of power as such has never led to the disintegration of a nation already in existence. A local community which gained independence turned into a separate new nation only if this was backed by political phenomena, either of significant importance capable of continuous influence, which promoted the self-awareness and authoritativeness of a new community...

New national movements (in Eastern and Central Europe) were faced with the necessity to prove... the viability of the new communities. For that purpose they had to turn to "popular" factors lying deeper than the superficial correlation of forces. Thus, the *people* (peuple) which in Western Europe represented the dynamics of *social upsurge*, in Eastern and Central Europe became the decisive factor as well as a carrier of *unique national qualities* (Volk) which is endowed with the characteristics of a nation (language, customs, traditions, etc.) to a greater extent than the heterogeneous ruling strata. This is the essence of the difference, which defies exact translation, in the emotional colouring of the semantically identical words "populaire" and "popular." Thus came into being the factor which finally shattered the already unsta-

ble territorial status of this part of Europe, i.e. linguistic nationalism.

Linguistic nationalism is a specifically East and Central European phenomenon. Under the influence of nationalist theories that appeared primarily in Central and Eastern Europe, the idea gained wide popularity in Western Europe that a nation appears when the speakers of the same language unite to form a state. However, this has not yet occurred in this world. The contemporary idea of a nation is primarily a political notion: here the point of departure is the state framework which the people, urged by the power of democratized mass national feelings, strives to encompass, with which it wants to become one. But whereas at the beginning of the 19th century these tendencies largely corresponded to the existing state frameworks and were aimed only at abolition of the state formations which were above these frameworks and were not deeply rooted (the Hapsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire, etc.), with the advent of linguistic nationalism all nations of this region began to assess the situation they found themselves in from the standpoint of the linguistic balance of forces — those nations who had representatives of cognate languages on the other side of a historical border or who had already lost their historical borders put forward a programme of reunification carried out on the basis of linguistic kinship, while those whose territory accommodated a population linguistically unrelated to them favoured the programme of creating a monolingual state. The essence of both aspirations was basically the same: to overcome the instability of political existence by means of ethnic factors...

The argument often used by the partisans of a return to historical communities in Central and Eastern Europe that a language per se is not a nation-forming factor and that history alone can be such a factor is certainly true. But hence quite a different conclusion should be made since, on the other hand, it is also true that in the specific conditions of Central and Eastern Europe common lan-

guage has become a historical and political factor, first of all, a factor of territorial demarcation of the already existing national boundaries and in certain cases, that of forming new nations.

The growth of linguistic nationalism led to the utter instability of international borders in Central and Eastern Europe... In this situation the greatest problem consists not even in that the linguistic boundaries are extremely uncertain and do not coincide with the lines of political and economic demarcation, but in that the historical memory preserved by the greatest majority of this region's nations embraced, as a rule, a much greater territory than that inhabited by the speakers of a particular language. And as all over the world, here too, one's devotion to a certain nation not only bound members of a certain community to each other, it also bound this community to certain territorial entities inclusive of certain localities, ancient cities and historical monuments. This feeling became particularly strong if these territories were inhabited by a territorially isolated minority speaking a different language. A no less categorical demand was that launched by popular movements supporting the destruction of historical boundaries in order to capture regions with large cities. Thus before long a situation arose when newly born nations of a particular region entered hot disputes about borders with most of the neighbouring countries...

It's also true that in this region extremely obscure political theories and even outright lies began to flourish, which could not have even appeared in healthily developing societies, not to mention be believed. Yet it would have been naive to think that obscure theories or ill-intentioned propaganda could have forced development of political culture away from a direct path. A serious mass feeling can arise only on the basis of *strong emotions*, while these emotions themselves are evoked by *genuine experiences*. Confused theories and false propaganda affect individuals and communities only if the negative impressions they have experienced previously have misled them and made them capable of believing a half-truth, a lie, which makes it possible for them to justify their own frustration, sustain illusory hopes as well as find affirmation in unreal ideas and satisfy their emotions. Well-balanced minds don't accept half-truths and falsified propaganda. Hence the question: what fostered in the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe this state of psychological unbalance? All lines lead to some kind of *political hysteria* whose analysis must first of all reveal the historical shocks that have disrupted the development and upset the internal balance of these countries.

The nations of this region lacked what is so evidently, clearly and tangibly present in West European nations' actual life and their social consciousness — *real state and national frameworks*, capitals in their European sense and elaborate and time-proven mechanisms of connection between economics, politics, society's unitary elite and so on and so forth. In Western and Northern Europe a country's political upsurge or decline, its influence as a great power or loss of territories, conquest or loss of colonies — all that remained an episode in its history, sort of "adventure," a reminiscence, beautiful or sorrowful; after all, all difficult periods could be lived through without serious shock since there was something stable which could neither be taken away nor called in question. Contrary to that, in Eastern Europe national framework was something yet to be created or restored, something to fight for and constantly protect — and, at that, not only from external violence of dynastic states, but also from the *indifference of a certain part of their own people* and the fragility of national consciousness. This situation is responsible for the most salient feature of the political

Yesterday's agitators become today's government. Tomorrow everything will be the other way round

and spiritual setting in Central and East European countries — *fear for the very existence of the community*. The life of each of these countries was negatively affected by state power, alien to them and devoid of firm rooting, European in form in some cases and a source of unbearable oppression in others, but which, regardless of the title it held — imperial, kingly or that of a sultanate — deprived the community of its best sons by recruiting the most talented of them for its own service and sending the most incorruptible to jail or the scaffold. Quarrels over historical and ethnic boundaries between peoples inhabiting this region gave rise to an mutual hostility between them, which was accompanied by mutual enmity and insults, and whenever an opportunity presented itself they indulged in resorting to the same treatment of each other which they learned from the emperors, czars, and sultans. All these nations experienced the psychological state caused by the loss of the sacred symbols of national history, the threat of their alienation, or by the awareness that one's own people or part of it are oppressed by foreign occupiers.

The revival of devotion to the nation was necessary because these nations were represented by hesitant masses which should have been *inspired* by a national idea or, as is customarily formulated in those climes, *national consciousness* should have been awakened in them.

What was the use of it in, for instance, France or Britain? 90 percent of these people are unconsciously *British or French* just like they are *fathers or husbands, bourgeois or proletarian* without being aware of it, or just *people*. A clear-cut awareness of one's identity and one's place in the world comes to people only in *critical moments*. In the case of the British or the French there is no point in constantly sustaining in them a sharpened awareness of their national self-identity, because it will awaken of itself when need be, and when it happens there will be no doubt as to which awareness it is — British or French, for what other awareness may awaken? In Central and Eastern Europe, on the contrary, everything was questionable — first the human soul was hunted for by various dynastic interests, and later by different national interests. Thus, a local landlord, a provincial leader, a parson, a schoolmaster, a judge and a local artisan who reads newspapers joined the dispute motivated by their respective emotions, interests and *idées fixes* and at times they had quite different ideas on the matter. At times a Hungarian or a Slovak peasant was faced daily with such *insoluble rebuses* which a French peasant may happen to solve once in a century at best. When one compares East European popular masses having no settled self-awareness with patriots inspired by their ideas, the feeling arises sometimes that an idea so persistently declared embraces, in fact, a very limited circle in a particular region...

Fear for the existence of a community became that decisive factor which *undermined positions of democracy* in these countries and narrowed possibilities for democratic development. For the contemporary political development of a European community to be harmonious and follow a direct path, only one thing is essential — *uniting in one whole for the cause of the community and the cause of freedom*...

Democracy and nationalism are two phenomena which have common roots and are so profoundly interdependent that a breach of this interdependence may entail the most serious consequences. This happened in Central and Eastern Europe where attainment of a national community was not linked to emancipation of the man, moreover, these nations have lived through historical cataclysms which might be regarded as ample proof that the fall of those in power in political and social spheres coupled with transition to an

absolutely unlimited democracy is fraught with tremendous risk for national communities, and is capable of plunging them into catastrophic circumstances. These cataclysms have engendered the most terrible monster of contemporary European political development — *antidemocratic nationalism*. Unfortunately, we are so accustomed to this phrase that we don't even notice the flagrant *absurdity* of developing specific virtues of a free individual, expecting manifestations of spontaneous enthusiasm, conscious self-sacrifice and responsible activity in the interests of a community which *does not guarantee* elementary conditions for the development of human freedom...

It is impossible to make use of democratic achievements in the conditions of panic and fear when the broadening of democracy is viewed as a threat to the common national cause. *To be a democrat means first of all to be free from fear*, fear of the differently minded, of speakers of different languages, of those of a different race, of revolutions, conspiracies, the enemy's crafty plots, hostile propaganda, neglect, intolerance, and generally all those imaginary dangers which our fear makes real. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe felt scared *because* they were not full-fledged mature democracies; and they couldn't have become such *because* they were scared. A boundlessly free political development devoid of all fears would, in many respects, have collided with these nations' complex of fear — it might have hindered carrying out an aggressive manoeuvre, or could have hampered the realization of an aggressive foreign policy dictated by fear, or it could have become an obstacle in affirming some false political concept whose inconsistency was impossible to demonstrate in the atmosphere of nationwide fear; or else it could have granted too great opportunities to ethnic minorities who were alien, indifferent or hostile to the indigenous ethnic group and who might threaten national unity, etc.

Thus, under the influence of constant fear of danger, everything that *genuine* democracies resort to only in cases of *genuine* danger became the rule — limitation of democratic freedoms, censorship, searches for "enemy's agents" and "traitors," securing order or its semblance by violence, as well as attaining national unity at the expense of freedom. The most diverse forms and methods of falsification and corruption of democracy come into being — from the most inconspicuous and often unconscious to the most flagrant ones.

When the opinion prevails that the outcome of a "war of languages" is the question of a nation's existence it becomes a real war in the course of which for the sake of victory no tough, extreme methods, which many nations know only too well as extraordinary measures resorted to in a *genuine* war, are shunned. At this moment *oppression of national minorities starts and their resentment begins*. Absolutely pointless is the dispute over what came first — oppression on the part of the majority or antigovernment propaganda on the part of the minorities. *Fear for their existence* affects the disputants in such a way that those who have retained common sense remain outside the debates. Here the situation arises when propaganda for national minority children learning folk songs in the language of the majority takes on the character of sophisticated forcible linguistic expansionism, while the contrary agitation calling on them not to sing songs in a foreign language but sing their own ones instead is considered dangerous antigovernment propaganda. An offended ethnic minority is extremely inventive in describing the of-

fenses and oppressive methods used against them, while the majority is equally inexhaustible in picturing the disasters inflicted by the ill-minded "subversive" activity of propagandists who have studied in foreign universities and at propagandist courses and who now instill confusion in the souls of the kind and peace-loving ethnic minority. The absurdity of this situation consists in that all this phraseology and philosophizing and all these illusions *immediately change places* as soon as the former majority becomes a minority as a result of territorial changes.

One may be moved to tears listening to the outpourings of Hungarians about Slovak peasants' kindness and humility or to reasonings of Czechs concerning Hungarian peasants' nobility, reliability and civil virtues; it only remains to marvel why life is so unbearable in Eastern Europe where there are

so many benevolent governments and so many kind and loyal peasants, and whence the multitudes of evil-spirited proponents of pan-Slavinism and a great number on no less evil-spirited revisionist agitators who indefatigably incite these peoples against their legal gov-

ernments. However, it's difficult to apply the notions of a "legal government" and "agitator" in their West European sense where *yesterday's agitators* become *today's legal government*, and tomorrow everything changes in the opposite direction. In the world of wise governments and kind and industrious peoples first appear prophets who foretell dangers threatening the nation, and there appear cultural movements inspired by the national idea and widely supported by the authorities; this is followed by suspicion with regard to cultural movements of ethnic minorities, which engenders in them animosity towards the government, to which, in their turn, the authorities react by using administrative sanctions; subsequently there arise antigovernment movements which the authorities welcome with jails and police bayonets; then comes the turn of plots answered by systematic suppression of minorities; all this ends in killings, riots and war...

Instability of existence and territorial disputes bring about territorial orientation so characteristic of Central and Eastern Europe, accompanied by affirmation of a nation's strength, might and the idea of its prosperity. This approach dooms to political and cultural sterility primarily... those nations who put forward territorial claims, but also affects the "possessing" nations who try to preserve the *status quo*. In countries where the question of *which territories they are afraid to lose* or *what territories they lay claims to* becomes *the most disturbing for the nation*, the nation's prosperity begins in the long run to be connected first of all with its territorial status: the people begin to revive in themselves the national feeling, national hopes, *constantly re-creating the picture of the country's present or future situation*. This is an extremely *antidemocratic* approach. As such it implies neither oppression nor domination, but on the whole it is *incompatible with democracy*, because democracy is the victory of the concept of *man as creator* over the concept of *man as conqueror and possessor*, and its most important lesson is that a nation which aspires to prosperity in its development by relying on its own internal strength is much more powerful than that which attempts — at times straining all its forces — to guarantee its prosperity at the expense of other peoples...

Peoples speak to each other the language taught them by emperors, czars, and sultans



"I began to be proud of my people. After the August events my perception of what is going on in Nagorny Karabakh has become more acute. In the past it was something of a remote concern for me, but after we in Moscow went through it all ourselves..."

E. Rotankova

The 50-year-old **Nataliya Perova** is the editor-in-chief and the founder of the world's only journal which publishes in English the anthology of modern Russian literature. The name of the journal is *Glas* and it introduces the foreign reader to the talented Russian writers and poets.

Nataliya dreamt of working jointly with foreign partners and creating an interesting journal as early as during the "stagnation period." For 30 years she has been looking all over the world for people who shared her ideas, among whom is her co-editor Andrew Bromfield from Ire-



land and Arch Tait from Great Britain. The idea of the journal *Glas* has been supported by a group of literary translators who have founded the independent publishing house Russliit.

The first issue of *Glas* came out in Great Britain and Ireland last summer. British literary critics compared it to a guide to Russia's quickly changing literary world. However, some of the authors whose works are published in the journal are not well known in Russia — their works first ap-

peared in the West and only later did they return to their native land. These authors include Leonid Latynin, Mikhail Aizenberg, Tatiana Shcherbina...

Nataliya Perova graduated from the Philological Department of Moscow State University, worked for Intourist and speaks fluent English. She began her publishing career at Progress and Sovetskaya Literatura Publishers.


A. Pyasetskaya

Sergei Osnach, 21, from the Ukrainian town of Shostka, was arrested last April for "dodging the draft." He has been sentenced to 18 months of corrective labour.

The fate of Sergei and 12 other prisoners of conscience, most of whom are members of the religious sect Jehovah's Witnesses, is being closely followed by Amnesty International. In its Moscow office they pin great hopes on the promise



of the new Soviet military leaders to work out a law on alternative military service that will provide an alternative for those whom faith forbids to take guns in their hands.



Arvin Shreeve, 61, a former specialist on garden architecture, has founded in the suburb of Ogden, Utah, a religious sect of 60 people. The greater part of the commune is made up of women who have become disenchanted with family life. But instead of prayers, "comrades-in-faith" have been spending their free time in sexual orgies, including those of lesbian and homosexual character. Apart from general leadership of the commune, Shreeve also headed one of the "women's councils"

T-shirts with the inscription "I survived the putsch" have appeared in Moscow. After last August, no matter what one is discussing and who the interlocutor is, he is invariably asked the question: "And where were you during the putsch?"

During the putsch, the 33-year-old singer and the Honoured Artiste of the Russian Federation, **Alexander Malinin**, was at the barricades. He sang his songs there. Now it is rumoured that it is for those songs near the White House that he has been given the title of Honoured Artiste.

"Indeed, I sang near the White House," says Malinin. "But in reality, my papers were long ago submitted for approval. Like everyone else, I learned from radio and newspaper reports that the edict with my name had been signed by the President of the Republic. I take my new title very seriously. Had I felt that I was given it for coming, like thousands of other Muscovites, to the Russian Parliament, I would have refused to accept it..."

That night Alexander Malinin came to the White House together with his wife. He was dressed in usual clothes, not at all in concert attire. But people recognized him at once and cried: "Hurrah, Malinin is with us!" According to him, he has never in his life sung like he did that night at the barricades.

"Barankin, be human!"

The Soviet-French joint venture that was presented in the Rakhmaninov Hall of the Conservatoire has been named in the spirit of the old Dyagilev tradition — The Russian Season. The new firm has set as its task the promotion of Russian classical music with the help of modern compact discs. The artistic director of The Russian Season is the 50-year-old musicologist and a secretary of the RSFSR Union of Composers, **Evgeny Barankin**.

By his biography, convictions, and gentle humour with which he accepts what is going on around him, Evgeny Barankin is a typical representative of the 1960s generation. His brilliant musical education (the Central Musical School, the musical college under the Conservatoire on Merzlyakovskiy Lane and, finally, the study of the violin in the Gnesins Institute) and first successful concerts (the string quartet in which he played became the laureate of the All-Union Competition of Chamber Ensembles in 1965) set him up for a successful career. But Evgeny Barankin has opted for the difficult work of a teacher and journalist. For many years he was the deputy editor-in-chief of the Sovetsky Kompozitor All-Union Publishers and a permanent contributor to *NT*. He delivers lectures on masterpieces of 20th century Russian music. And one often hears from the stage the sounds of a piano used as an illustration and the second voice. The accompanist is Masha Barankina, a student of the Gnesins Institute and the best work of the Maestro.



Alexei Bukalov

"edifying" both spiritually and physically the 28 "sisters," the youngest of whom has just turned 14. It seems that Shreeve had been "driving the devil to the Underworld" so passionately that one of the women went to the police.

It has been established in the course of the investigation that in the past Shreeve was a convinced Mormon and regarded his bent for polygamy to be granted by God. He has been excommunicated from the Mormon Church for some of his sins, but that did not prevent him from using the name of the saint as a cover for his philandering and founding of a religious sect.

In the United States they are trying to understand how Shreeve could acquire a magic power over the residents of an American backwater? "We are too gullible and are prepared to follow anyone who proclaims himself a prophet," explained the lawyer of one of the "victims."



The famous Soviet rock-producer and the "star" of the 1960s music "business" **Yuri Aizenshpis** has recently become the commercial director of the newspaper *Moskovsky Komsomolets*. It is rumoured that his predecessor has run away with

a significant sum of money. Yuri prefers to be tight-lipped about this incident, although he admits that the newspaper is currently experiencing serious financial difficulties.

Yuri Aizenshpis embarked on the road to show-business as a manager (no one knew that word at the time) of the first Soviet rock-group Sokol — he made arrangements for concerts, acquired instruments and equipment. On one occasion he needed dollars to buy a new amplifier...

Aizenshpis was convicted under the notorious Article 88 ("hard currency and gold"). He was brought to trial not so much as a black marketeer of foreign currency, but rather as one of the leaders of the country's rock movement. Yuri had to do two terms — 17

years in all — before he was allowed "to do legally what he had been doing illegally before." He began to work with Leningrad "teams" Alisa, Auktision and Akvarium. But Aizenshpis' greatest success as a producer was his work with the group Kino that reached the peak of its popularity thanks to a large extent to Yuri's energy and efforts.

Despite his new job, Yuri does not intend to give up show-business. Following the tragic death of Kino's leader, Victor Tsoi, he "took under his wing" the up-and-coming group Technology that plays "computer rock."

Much to the delight of sensuality-lovers, after a 17-year interruption the well-known Dutch actress **Syl-**



via Kristel, 37, has again decided to play the role of Emmanuelle from the Ame-

rican film of the same name. At 21 Sylvia played the role of a naked seducer, making the 400 million film-goers in 85 countries watch with a not only sinking heart the bedroom escapades of the actress. After Emmanuelle, Sylvia acted in another 30 films where scenes in bedrooms were not merely incidental.

Yet it seems that Sylvia got the greatest satisfaction during the shooting of her first film. Put on a production line, her natural talent began to wane under the influence of her personal dramas, addiction to alcohol and drugs, and divorces.

And now Sylvia has decided to begin a new life or to remember her earlier years. The actress has no doubts whatsoever about the success of her new film, nor does her 15-year-old son, who with the interest and knowledge of an expert watches all the previous films starring his mother.

A maverick member of the opposition

Last year, on the eve of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Cuba, the well-known Cuban writer **Carlos Alberto Montaner** sent the Soviet president an open letter in which he called on him to cut military and economic aid to the communist government because Castro in reality "does not cherish kindly feelings for the Soviet Union regarding it as a second-rate power." At that time the letter received a wide response all over the world, except ... in the USSR.

Unlike most Cuban emigrants who have settled down in Florida, Montaner lives in Madrid where he heads the international agency Firms Press and edits the influential newspaper *Nuevo Herald*.

According to Montaner, the Cuban opposition can be divided into two groups: the "moderates" and the "extremists." The moderates, of which the writer considers himself a member, believe that communism on the Island of Freedom should be "eliminated" exclusively by peaceful means — by persuading or forcing Castro to agree to democratic reforms and general direct elections under the supervision of independent observers. "Castro should be given an opportunity for an honourable departure. Only in this way can we avoid bloodshed during the change of power," asserts Montaner.

The editor takes a dim view of the "extremists" from the National Cuban-American Fund headed by Jorge Mas Canosa who intend to overthrow the communist regime with the help of a military coup.

Montaner thinks that in the post-communist period the country should be run not by the newly arrived "saviours of the Fatherland," but by their own Havels and Walesas — the dissidents who have not lost touch with the grim Cuban reality: Elizardo Sanchez, Mario Chanes and Roberto Luque Escalona.

O. Vishnyakov



The real writer is a script writer

The cinema indeed appears to be the prime art of all

When did it all begin? I remember well, it was on that dark day when the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* featured Nina Andreyeva's "I Cannot Go Back on My Principles," and our newly emerging *glasnost* was unable to offer a worthy rebuff. We journalists were censored, and producing a retort in newspaper columns was impossible until a rebuff had been administered by a newspaper with Communist Party seniority over *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, to wit *Pravda*. Of course it never entered our heads to rush to the Journalists Union for encouragement. Actually the Journalists Union is no Union at all, just a name. It is true that there was the Writers' Union who, one would think, could have acted. After all, it has so many celebrities, parliamentarians, Communist Party Central Committee members, prize winners and people with the Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union or Hero of Socialist Labour.

However, at the Cinematographers' Union on that very day a number of people gathered to pen an uncompromising reply. They invited the writers to sign, but the writers retorted that the film makers could get along without them. And so

they retired to wait for directives from above and to see which way the wind would blow. The film makers didn't.

I well remember that at the time I composed in my mind an application for membership to this wonderful Cinematographers' Union, though I have nothing to do with the cinema, and even do not go to the movies that often. I very much wanted to be with like-minded people. I thought I could be of use, even as a typist. Today few remember that decisive stand taken against the Andreyeva letter. Yet at that time the attitude towards this publication was much

like the question so often asked today as to where one was between August 19 and August 21?

From that day on the film makers have shown themselves most worthy at decisive moments in our life. It is said that their leaders, Elem Klimov and Andrei Smirnov, have not achieved much. However, I for one distinctly see that on the whole they did achieve much. Rather they accomplished something priceless, indeed something is really invaluable as regards the Cinematographers' Union generally. The Union is indebted to its leaders' high-minded stand for its shining honour.

Prior to August 19 whenever it was said that someone was a member of the Writers' Union that aroused at best indifference or a sarcastic grin, at worst contempt. But any member of the Cinematographers' Union commanded respect. This Union's new leaders were again faced with a choice on August 19.

I have before me a leaflet which the magazine *Iskusstvo Kino* (Cinema Art) circulated during the putsch. It presented an ultimatum to the "new Soviet leadership" undersigned by Khudanazarov, President of the Cinematographers' Union of the USSR. Whom were the film makers addressing? Filmgoers, no doubt. The world consists of all sorts of people. However, among the signers one will no doubt discover



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

a favourite actor — some wonderful character who in a movie caused one to laugh or cry, in short fully empathize. They include Inna Churikova, Oleg Tabakov, Lyudmila Gurchenko, Zinoviy Gerd, Marlen Khutsiev, Svetlana Nemolyaeva, Grigory Chukhrai and Tatiana Samoilova, to mention several of the famous names that were listed in three tall columns. The actual text was brief. It ran: "Believe nothing! Do not be afraid! Beg for nothing! Trust not a single word. Again self-styled pretenders promise 'law and order,' but again we see tanks in the streets and parasites around our necks. Do not be afraid to rise up against them. Ask for nothing. A handout from these self-styled rulers means only tears of shame."

That I have recollected what took place some time ago and simultaneously so circumstantially describe the leaflet is not fortuitous. I did this because I find it harder and harder to judge the rôle that creative intellectuals play in the life of society. Again I see the conduct of the Cinematographers' Union as noble, in stark contrast to that of the writers.

Before August 19 the heads of the Russian Federation Writers' Union brought upon themselves undying shame with their "Address to the Nation." That was the last straw as earlier had been the "Letter of the 53," the "Letter of the Seven" and ideological preparation for the putsch newspapers and magazines of the Writers' Union plus shameful plenary meetings. Yet even after the August triumph they continued to add to their shame, more specifically by defending their "Yellow House," the headquarters of the Russian Federation Writers' Union, where professional patriots... quartered. With a scandalous and amazing desire to preserve the Writers' Union at all costs, they defended themselves against democratic writers.

We ordinary folk find the film

makers closer to our hearts, which is to be gauged even from their magazine *Iskusstvo Kino*. This voluminous effort is currently sold in the streets and on the corners at quite a price, as much as some 100 rubles each for the last three issues. No doubt these issues command so high a black market price because of Alexander Kabakov's novel *The Maker*. No wonder, as he wrote *The Non-Returnee* foreseeing what was to come. But I think this latest piece of his is read even by those who usually don't read at all. Experts studying the market potential have long known that books dealing with modern themes are preferred to all else, that is to the classics, to historical novels and even mystery stories. That is because people want to read about themselves.

In Kabakov's works ordinary folk are here and now. They are about us, about the love we feel for ourselves and the contempt we have for ourselves, about our city which is so admirable and yet so terrible, about the jokes we tell, about the language we speak, about the dreams we have, about our fancies and fears. Even if it be an inconspicuous sentence near the end of this narrative, which states: "And again you torment people, as always with no point." That one phrase so well describes "them," all those who we sought or did not seek to resist those 72 hours in August and those 70 odd years in every season, the "they" who killed three wonderful young men on the night of August 20 and countless missions during previous nights and decades.

This is a well told, hardboiled story that's fascinating. What is particularly remarkable about it is that it is a love story. Its characters love one another with a happy, anguished, passionate, mundane, sinful and pure love.

The "real writers" have long expelled love from their magazines, books and even their love stories.

Can you imagine a love story without love? Who wants to read such muck?

Iskusstvo Kino is crammed with love. Take that wonderful story "Chok-Chok" by Friedrich Gorenstein, the first installment of which appeared in the June issue. In this super-modern piece one reads the good old classical Russian prose and discerns the influence of Chekhov and Bunin.

"These contributions are not so much about the cinema, as about the world around the cinema," Yuri Arabov observed in the July issue. This is true of the whole of *Iskusstvo Kino* with its editor Konstantin Shcherbakov.

Perhaps that is why *Iskusstvo Kino* is so readable. Perhaps it is so readable because the film makers in no way remain aloof from the world around them, in no way put themselves above the world around them, above us with our tears, enthusiasm, fancies and fears. The issues prepared for circulation in summer were indeed prophetic, as if somebody had whispered into the editor's ear what was going to happen. Even now reading it makes the flesh crawl. "When I imagine the prospect of a return to totalitarianism and clublaw in our life, I feel neither fear nor anger nor disgust, nor even alarm, but a sickening revulsion... It would have been super-repulsive... It would have testified to some ominous, incurable, unremediable disease of our society," Alexander Gelman notes.

A sickening revulsion for totalitarianism. Certainly a most understandable human feeling. I was thinking of how to formulate in brief the basic idea that runs like a red thread through the various issues of *Iskusstvo Kino*. I was also thinking of how to most aptly depict the fervour of the Cinematographers' Union which so attracts all who seek freedom. There it is — a sickening revulsion for totalitarianism.

Tatiana Ivanova

The power of the Divine Muscle

The Mother of God's celestial victory over the Red Dragon sealed the fate of the August putsch in the USSR

This is how Bishop Ioann, a person who has been receiving revelations from the Mother of God since 1984, views the situation. Recently, Ioann organized a Centre of the Mother of God in Moscow.

The reverend fathers of the Centre of the Mother of God believe that personalities — Yeltsin or Gorbachev, Kryuchkov or Yazov — do not really matter. They see the victory "in the fight for Russia and the rest of the world" as a demonstration of Divine mercy and thank the Mother of God for it.

Bishop Ioann calls the August events in Moscow "the sacred war that crowns the Apocalyptic drama that started in 1917." According to Ioann, in 1917 the Holy Mother of God "was ousted by the devil." However, in August 1991 the Leader of the Heavenly Army succeeded in dislodging the Red Dragon from the skies over Moscow. Bishop Ioann thus commented on the results of the fight over Moscow:


"Our all-loving and kind Mother has revealed Her Love to us and demonstrated the power of the Divine Muscle. If this country remains blind and unresponsive, if it ascribes the victory in the great war to someone else or underestimates the treacherous designs of the conspirators, one more temptation will be sent to it and that temptation will not be possible to avoid without victims..."

The Church of the Mother of God started preparing for the fight against the unholy forces long before August 1991. In the middle of June this year the First All-Russia Council of the Mother of God declared that Russia solemnly rejected an alliance with the devil and devoted Russia to the Holy Mother of God. According to the reverend fathers of the Centre of the Mother of God, that declaration

allowed the Mother of God to defeat Satan.

However, Ioann warns against euphoria: "Many a battle is still ahead of us. The enemy is wounded in its heart, but is still alive. It will only be in the days of the coming Transfiguration that Satan will finally perish."

Ioann sees a way out of the economic and political crisis if all the citizens of Russia praise the Mother of God. If the country does not give Her due to the Mother of God, it will continue "to plunge into the abyss."



Translating religious instructions into the language of lay actions, Ioann offers the following anti-crisis programme: to rename all streets, parks, institutions, etc. which have a communist past, to replace portraits and statues of communist

idols with portraits and statues of Jesus Christ, the Holy Mother and Saints, to build chapels in the steets, yards, offices and private flats, to build a Tomb of Unknown Victims in the place of the pulled-down monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the ChK (now KGB), to bury the body of Vladimir Lenin and to build a chapel of the Mother of God on the site of Lenin's Mausoleum, and to declare the time from August 1991 to August 1992 the Year of the Mother of God.

The reverend fathers from the Centre of the Mother of God also think it is necessary to praise the last Russian Tsar and martyr Nicholas II "for in his person the Mother of God and Russia were insulted." The fathers are also convinced that all officials must accept the Mother of God in their hearts because She leads the righteous people. "Only the righteous will be able to perform the mission of the Mother of God and to cleanse and transform Russia."

Anna Pyasetskaya

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
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
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
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